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THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
THE PANEL PROCEDURES OF THE GATT AND THE WTO:
THE ROLE OF GATT AND WTO PANELS IN TRADE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Petko D. Kantchevski∗
“Every experienced lawyer knows that
cases are most often won and lost on
procedural grounds.”
D. Palmeter & P. Mavroidis

I. INTRODUCTION
In February 1945, the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations (ECOSOC) adopted a resolution and called for a conference to
draft a charter for the International Trade Organization. The charter,
known as the Havana Charter, concluded in 1948, but never came into
effect due to the U.S. Congress’ failure to ratify it in 1950. Yet, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, 1 which
was designed to be a part of the Havana Charter, came into force in
eight states on January 1, 1948 pursuant to a protocol of provisional
application. 2 Not only was the GATT “provisional” in nature
throughout its entire existence, but its dispute settlement rules were
vague and lacked details. In fact, the GATT contained only two
provisions on dispute settlement, Articles XXII and XXIII, and neither
contained any specific procedure. These dispute settlement provisions
formed the basis of both GATT jurisprudence and decisions of the
GATT Contracting Parties. The GATT was a multilateral trade
instrument that provided a valuable framework for removing barriers

∗
Petko Kantchevski is a Masters candidate in International Law at the Graduate
Institute of International Studies, Geneva. The author is deeply grateful to Professor
Lucius Caflisch for his unusual mentorship. The author would also like to thank
Professor Joost Pauwelyn for his comments on an earlier draft. The article considers
the differences between the GATT and the WTO’s dispute settlement proceedings as
of June 2006, and all mistakes remain the sole responsibility of the author.
1
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, October 30,
1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, [hereinafter GATT, GATT 1947, or old GATT]. The GATT
1947 should be distinguished from the GATT 1994. For the differences between the
two, see text accompanying note 117 infra.
2
Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Jan. 1, 1948, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
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to international trade through multilateral trade negotiations called
“trade rounds.” The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (1986–1994) (hereinafter Uruguay Round) culminated in
the creation of an international organization called World Trade
Organization (WTO). 3 When the WTO started functioning in the
beginning of 1995, it had the chance to fully benefit from the GATT
dispute settlement legacy developed over almost half a century.
By reviewing the evolution of the procedural rules from 1947 on
and comparing them with the current WTO rules, this Article will
assess the differences between the old GATT dispute settlement
mechanism and the new WTO system. This analysis will show that the
differences are not significant because the WTO system is based
largely on what has been learned through the existence of the GATT.
Additionally, and most importantly, it will show that the WTO system
is heading in the right direction because it is a more sophisticated
system compared to that of the GATT.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PANEL PROCEEDINGS
A. Going from Diplomacy to Legal Adjudication
When it comes to resolving trade disputes between contracting
parties, the dispute resolution mechanisms within the GATT resemble
diplomacy more than they do adjudication. In the early years of the
GATT, it was the GATT Council Chairman who decided the dispute
rulings. Later, working parties were organized to deal with disputes
under GATT Article XXIII:2. Working parties included the
complaining party, the party complained against, and all the interested
government representatives. Generally, working parties consisted of
about five to twenty delegations, depending upon the importance of
the question and the interests involved. 4 These working parties and
their members operated by consensus and negotiation—a situation that
may correctly be assessed as a political method of dispute settlement.

3

Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, LT/UR/A/2 (in the sense of Articles I to XIV) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
The official text of the WTO Agreement and the agreements annexed to it, which were
concluded at the end of the Uruguay Round are to be found in Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), reprinted in GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay
Round, 6 (1994).
4
Annex on Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the
Field of Dispute Settlement, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) ¶ 6 (1980) [hereinafter 1979
Annex on the Customary Practice of the GATT].
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In 1952, panels of three or five third-party experts from the GATT
began hearing disputes arising out of the GATT. The pioneer case
decided by a panel is Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines,5
which involved Norway and Germany as opposing parties. 6 The
parties eventually settled the dispute by mutual agreement, 7 but it
became the first serious attempt towards third-party adjudication
within the GATT.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the procedural rules of the GATT panels
had a limited scope because the method of adjudication remained
highly diplomatic, and a large number of the panelists were diplomats,
not lawyers. The fact that there was no legal division within the
Secretariat of the GATT from 1948 to 1983 confirms that the
Contracting Parties attempted to avoid legalism.8 Interesting evidence
of this assertion is found in the annex to the Understanding Regarding
Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance 9 of
1979, which provides:
At the Review Session (1955) the proposal to
institutionalise the procedures of panels was not
adopted by CONTRACTING PARTIES mainly
because they preferred to preserve the existing
situation and not to establish judicial procedures which
might put excessive strain on the GATT.10

5
Report of the Panel, Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, (Oct. 31,
1952), GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 53 (1953).
6
In this case, Norway complained that reasonable expectations deriving from
tariff negotiations conducted with Germany on the basis of equal tariff treatment of
two closely related items (two kinds of sardines which were “like products”) were
impaired. It is interesting that the formulation of the claim much resembles a “nonviolation complaint, which was rarely used in the old GATT dispute settlement
system. Germany was invited to remove the competitive inequality between the
products concerned by a Contracting Parties’ Resolution.” GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.)
at 30–31 (1953).
7
A note on the outcome has been published in GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 69
(1959).
8
In this sense, see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, xiii (Kluwer Law International 1997).
9
Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210 (1980) [hereinafter
1979 Understanding].
10
1979 Annex on the Customary Practice of the GATT, supra note 4, at 215,
footnote to ¶1.
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Even in the beginning of the Uruguay Round in 1986, dispute
settlement within the GATT remained highly diplomatic. Parties had
the opportunity to settle, meaning that, for example, the GATT Parties
still had the freedom to accept or reject the proposed panel solution,
because adoption of a panel report required a positive consensus
among the GATT Council.11
The adoption of panel reports by positive consensus of all GATT
Parties appears contestable, because from a legal perspective, GATT
Article XXV:4 provides, “except as otherwise provided for in this
Agreement, decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be
taken by a majority of the votes cast.” 12 The agreement does not
prescribe any exceptions to this Article; therefore, in the early years of
the GATT, adoption of panel reports required a majority vote. 13
However, in the 1950s, it became a customary practice for Contracting
Parties to adopt panel reports by consensus. The Ministerial
Declaration of 1982 clarified this procedure, stating that
“CONTRACTING PARTIES reaffirmed that consensus will continue
to be the traditional method of resolving disputes.” 14 At the
Ministerial Meeting, the Contracting Parties tried to adopt a proposal,
according to which the disputing parties would not have the right to
vote on the panel report adoption. As a result, the GATT Parties made
an effort to include a “consensus minus two” rule for the adoption of
panel reports in the Ministerial Declaration.15 However, even if the
“consensus minus two” rule had been adopted, it would not have
solved the problem because one GATT party could easily have found
another GATT party to help block the adoption of a report.
On one hand, E.U. Petersmann argues that the majority of
decisions on dispute settlement within the old GATT were legally
inadmissible. In his view, the Roman law maxim nemo debet esse
judex in propria causa (no one should be a judge in his own case) is a
general principle of law and is recognized as a principle of

11

Under the old GATT practice of taking decisions by consensus, a single
formal objection by any Contracting Party, including the respondent, was enough to
block the adoption of a panel report.
12
GATT 1947, supra note 1, at art. XXV:4.
13
See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Strengthening GATT Procedures for Settling
Trade Disputes, 11 WORLD ECONOMY 55, 74 (1988).
14
Ministerial Decision on Dispute Settlement of 29 November 1982, L/5424,
GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 13, ¶ (x), (1983) [hereinafter 1982 Ministerial
Declaration].
15
Rosine Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel Works and
Does Not, 4 J. INT’L ARB. 53, 95–96 (1987).
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international law.16 Therefore, a possible solution to the blockage of a
panel report adoption was to exclude the losing party from voting.17
On the other hand, the procedural rules of the GATT had evolved
over the years, and although the provisions of GATT Articles XXII
and XXIII were initially unclear, the GATT Parties increasingly
legalized and codified the GATT dispute settlement practice. Since the
Kennedy Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations between 1962 and
1967, a number of decisions and understandings made in 1966, 1979,
1982, 1984, and 1989 codified and supplemented the procedural
dispute settlement rules. 18 The most important documents among
these are the 1979 Understanding and its 1979 Annex on the
Customary Practice of the GATT. 19 These documents prescribe that
each panel was required to organize its own procedures by holding two
or three formal meetings with the parties and inviting parties to present
their views in written or oral form. It also permitted any Contracting
Party that had a substantial interest in the matter, but who was not
directly involved in the dispute (i.e., a third party), to be heard by the
panel. Over the years, panels gradually began to follow previous panel
findings, creating predictability within the system.
Some of the difficulties of the old GATT dispute resolution
mechanism included: (1) delays in the establishment of panels and the
adoption of panel reports; (2) “rule shopping” between the general
GATT procedure and the special procedure prescribed in the Tokyo
Round Agreements, which appeared not to be successful; 20 and (3)
increase of non-compliance with the GATT Council rulings, especially
in the 1980s. However, the major weakness of the GATT system was
that all important matters concerning the dispute settlement procedure
had to be decided by a consensus of the Contracting Parties. Thus the
parties to a dispute, and more particularly the losing party, could block

16

Petersmann, supra note 13, at 74.
“[A] Chairman of the GATT Council might, arguably, feel entitled likewise
to propose that persistent obstruction by the ‘losing’ party alone to the adoption of a
panel report does not affect the ‘consensus.’” Id. at 74–75.
18
All these documents can be found in 2 ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT
LAW AND PRACTICE 623–42 (WTO 1995).
19
GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210 (1979).
20
Not only “rule shopping,” but also a kind of “forum shopping” existed after
the Tokyo Round: the Contracting Parties could choose to bring a case before a panel
or before an Anti-Dumping Committee under the Anti-Dumping Code, or before a
special panel established by the Subsidies Code, following the procedure prescribed
by it.
17
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not only the adoption of a panel report, but also the establishment of a
panel.21
In the 1980s, the Contracting Parties attempted to solve the
problems associated with consensus and tried to prevent blocking the
establishment of panels by adopting the Decision on Improvements to
the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedure in 1989
(hereinafter 1989 Contracting Parties’ Decision). Although this
decision was applicable on a provisional basis until the end of the
Uruguay Round, it became the basis for the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter
DSU),22 which came into effect on January 1, 1995. The Contracting
Parties’ Decision made significant changes. For example, it reduced
the time limit to reply to consultation requests to ten days, and it
shortened the time in which negotiations could be entered into to thirty
days. The Contracting Parties’ Decision also provided the option of
requesting the establishment of a panel if consultations did not solve
the dispute within sixty days. However, perhaps its most important
improvement was in creating a barrier to block the establishment of a
panel. It provided that a decision to establish a panel must be made by
the second meeting of the GATT Council after the request first appears
on its agenda, unless the council decides otherwise, i.e., by consensus
not to establish a panel (the so-called negative consensus).23 However,
the Contracting Parties applied all these improvements only
provisionally, and one of the major difficulties was that there had been
no change in the actual rules at that time.24
Another weakness of the GATT dispute settlement system was the
possibility for GATT Contracting Parties to take unilateral actions.
Furthermore, the confidence in the ability of the GATT dispute
resolution mechanism to resolve difficult cases, especially in
21

Petersmann expresses a positive opinion on the overall adoption of the panel
reports, but emphasizes that since the 1980s there has been “blockage” of an
increasing number of reports. Petersmann, supra note 13, at 88–89. However,
Palmeter and Mavroidis remark that blocking of the reports only occur in very rare
cases. See DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE at 9 (2d ed., Cambridge
University Press 2004).
22
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1225 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
23
Art. F (a), Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and
Procedures, Decision of Apr. 12, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61 (1989).
24
Indeed, the risk of one party blocking adoption must often have influenced the
panel’s rulings within the GATT. The three panelists knew that the report also had to
be accepted by the “losing” party.
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politically sensitive areas, decreased in the 1980s. As a result,
individual Contracting Parties preferred to take unilateral and direct
action against other parties to enforce their rights rather than invoke
the GATT dispute settlement system.25
Japan – Agricultural Products26 is a case that illustrates the flaws
of the old procedure and the numerous opportunities for the parties,
particularly the defendant, to delay the dispute settlement proceedings.
Beginning in October 1981, the United States and Japan held informal
consultations regarding Japanese agricultural barriers. At that time,
diplomatic solutions were favored over recourse to law. Through July
1983, the United States officially submitted requests for consultations
within the GATT concerning agricultural restrictions related to
thirteen goods. One year later (and more than two years after the U.S.
first raised the issue of GATT violations), the parties reached a
compromise outside the GATT legal proceedings and signed an
agreement in July 1984. The United States agreed to withdraw its
complaint for two years, while Japan agreed to liberalize trade on six
types of goods. E. Eichmann observes that on the one hand, the
solution reached outside of the legal framework was the result of a
party’s political and trade influence: on the other hand, the solution
legitimized an otherwise illegal GATT practice that caused harm to
third parties. Consequently, the losers were those parties with less
political and economic clout.27
The new WTO system tackles the problem mentioned above by
legalization. Often referred to as “quasi-judicial,” the new dispute
settlement system is based more on law than its predecessor. This
Article analyzes many features of the new WTO system, the analysis
of which will lead to the conclusion of this Article.
First, a basic feature of the “legalization” of the WTO dispute
settlement system is the compulsory jurisdiction of a Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB).28 Member States of the WTO have accepted

25
WTO SECRETARIAT, A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM 14 (Cambridge University Press 2004) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
26
Report of the Panel, Japan—Restrictions on Import of Certain Agricultural
Products, L/6253 (Nov. 18, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 163 (1987).
27
Erwin P. Eichmann, Procedural Aspects of GATT Dispute Settlement: Moving
Towards Legalism, 8 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 38, 42–48 (1990).
28
Compulsory jurisdiction is rare in international law because, as a rule, disputes
involve sovereign states. The strongest argument in this respect is the optional
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The Member States of the UN must
recognize the jurisdiction of the Court in order for the court to be competent to hear
the respective dispute. As a matter of fact, there are only two global treaties in
international law—the WTO Agreement and the United Nations Convention of the
Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS)—which provide for compulsory dispute
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in advance the decisions of the DSB, according to Article 23.1 of the
DSU, which provides that Members shall have recourse to, and abide
by, the rules and procedure of the DSU.29 An adopted Appellate Body
report shall be “unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute”
on account of Article 17.14 of the DSU. 30 Although this provision
refers only to Appellate Body reports, it is also applicable to adopted
panel reports because the legal binding force comes from the DSB
decision.
Moreover, the compulsory jurisdiction of the DSB concerning the
settlement of disputes heavily influences the entire panel process. The
automatic character of this process allows the complainant to start the
procedure, going from one stage to another, bringing the case to a
binding decision by the DSB, even if the respondent is reluctant to
cooperate. The will and intention of the other party in this panel
process is essential because the major aim of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism is to “secure a positive solution to a dispute.”31
Unfortunately, a “positive solution” (i.e., a solution that is acceptable
to all parties) is not always possible. For this reason, the new
mechanism must provide some safeguards for the Members’ rights
under the WTO Agreements. Under the new dispute settlement
system, the respondent is not permitted to impede the initiation of the
panel procedure or to subsequently block the adoption of the panel
reports.
Another important element of the WTO dispute settlement system
is its legal primacy over all other means of dispute settlement. Unlike
the GATT, the DSU firmly stipulates that when a Member seeks
redress from a violation of obligations, nullification, or impairment of
benefits under the covered agreements, it “shall have recourse to, and
abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.”32 Article 23

settlement procedures. However, unlike the WTO Agreement, the UNCLOS excludes
from its compulsory procedure a number of disputes arising out of the interpretation
and application of the Convention. Note that the dispute settlement within the WTO
has a unique character. See, e.g., United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea,
Section 3, art. 297 et seq., Montego bay, Dec. 19, 1982, In force Nov. 16, 1994, 21
I.L.M. 1245 (1982).
29
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 17.14.
30
Id.
31
Id. at art. 3.7.
32
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 23.1. An exception to this rule reads: “Nothing in
this Agreement shall impair the rights of Members under other international
agreements, including the right to resort to the good offices or dispute settlement
mechanisms of other international organizations or established under any international
agreement.” Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Art. 11(3) (Apr. 15, 1994) (often referred to as the SPS Agreement). Reproduced in
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of the DSU also precludes the use of other unilateral action for the
resolution of WTO-related disputes. 33 Only on the basis of adopted
panel or Appellate Body reports can a Member initiate an action
against other Members, provided that there is an authorization from
the DSB.
Primacy of the WTO dispute settlement procedure also includes
primacy over bilaterally agreed settlements. A mutually acceptable
solution to a dispute is “clearly to be preferred,” 34 but it may not
comply with the WTO rules and may impair the rights of other
Members. For this reason, the DSU requires that the settlement of a
dispute be consistent with the WTO rules to ensure that agreements do
not impair the rights of other Members.
Furthermore, the WTO system encourages parties of a dispute to
reach a mutually agreed solution during each stage of the panel
process, and it allows the complainant to stop the panel procedure at
any given time. If this occurs, parties must notify the DSB and the

THE LEGAL TEXTS.THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 401 (Cambridge University Press & WTO 1999) at 65.
33
This means that an inconsistency of a trade measure with WTO obligations can
be determined only through recourse to the procedure provided in the DSU. However,
disputes on trade issues arising out of other international trade agreements, which
cover similar matters, may be submitted to other international fora. Since identical
trade issues may overlap in NAFTA and the WTO Agreements, NAFTA provides that
the claimant may choose which forum to use. Once a forum has been chosen, the
complainant has chosen a forum, it and cannot bring the same claim to the other
forum. Nonetheless, one may argue that even if the complainant submits a claim under
the NAFTA, the dispute would not be the same as the alleged violation and must relate
to the NAFTA and not the WTO Agreements. Consequently, the forum under the
NAFTA will examine whether the measure violates the NAFTA and not the WTO
Agreements. Hence, the legal basis to bring a claim will be different. In Mexico—Soft
Drinks, Mexico challenged the panel’s jurisdiction because, in its view, the dispute
was a part of a larger dispute between the United States and Mexico had already been
brought under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The panel found
that neither the subject matter nor the respective positions of the parties in the dispute
were identical under the NAFTA and the WTO. The panel added that:
[E]ven conceding that there seems to be an unresolved dispute
between Mexico and the United States under the NAFTA, the
resolution of the present WTO case cannot be linked to the NAFTA
dispute. In turn, any findings made by this Panel, as well as its
conclusions and recommendations in the present case, only relate to
Mexico's rights and obligations under the WTO covered agreements,
and not to its rights and obligations under other international
agreements, such as the NAFTA, or other rules of international law.
Panel Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, ¶ 7.15,
WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005).
34
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.7, second phrase.
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relevant councils and committees.35 To protect the interests of third
parties, the WTO system allows WTO Members the opportunity to
raise any points relating to the solution reached when the council or
committee convenes.36 This notification requirement avoids possible
interference with other Members’ rights due to a bilateral settlement
reached outside the panel or the appeal procedure. Interdependence
among all WTO Members in the international trading system is
inevitable, and this rule strengthens its multilateral character.
Thus the WTO has maintained the settlement feature of the
GATT, but is more fair to other parties in the agreement, especially
since the DSB is available if one party tries to over assert its political
and economic influence in negotiating a settlement.
B. A Unified Dispute Settlement System
Article II:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization37 stipulates that the DSU is an integral part of the
WTO Agreement, and more importantly, is binding upon all WTO
Members. All Members that are parties to the settlement procedure are
bound by the DSB’s decision concerning that dispute, thus providing
more predictability to WTO Members and minimizing the risk of
contradictory decisions. As a result, “opt outs” from WTO Multilateral
Agreements and the DSU are no longer possible. This new concept
improves and differs from those embodied in the agreements of the
Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (hereinafter Tokyo
Round) 38 because the old “GATT à la carte” system allowed
Contracting Parties to choose between the general GATT dispute
settlement mechanism and the special procedures prescribed by the
various agreements concluded in the Tokyo Round.39
35

Id. at art. 3.6.
Id.
37
WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at art. II:2
38
The system embodied in the Tokyo Round agreements are also known as
“GATT à la carte.”
39
This practice proved to be unsuccessful. See Petersmann, supra note 13, at 88–
89; see also Plank, supra note 15, at 89. Several panel reports following the Subsidies
Code were legally unsound and not adopted. For instance, the Subsidies Code
prescribed in Article 16(2) a two-month period for a panel to deliver its written report
to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Noting the complex
legal nature of subsidies, this time-limit seems unrealistic. Agreement on
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 56 (1980). Cf. Eichmann, supra
note 27, at 72 and text accompanying note 215. The author comes to a similar
conclusion. In addition, the Subsidies Code provided a mandatory conciliation phase
under Article XVII, which was unnecessary and only prolonged the process.
36
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This does not mean that the WTO Agreements40 do not prescribe
special rules for dispute settlement. Rather, the difference is that
Members will not be able to practice “rule shopping” by choosing the
procedure that will best suit them. If there is a special procedure,
which complements the general regime, the Members will follow the
special procedure because lex specialis derogate legi generali (the
more specialized norm prevails over the general). Article 1.2 of the
DSU confirms this application of special procedures.41 The Appellate
Body has stated in Guatemala-Cement that “the rules and procedures
of the DSU apply together with the special or additional provisions of
the covered agreement,” and if there is a conflict between them, the
special or additional provision prevails.42
Another advantage of the current WTO dispute settlement system
is that it avoids the fragmentation embodied in the earlier GATT
dispute settlement mechanism. Currently, all WTO Members are
parties to each of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, including the
DSU, because it is an integral part of the WTO Agreement. The same
requirements are applicable to every potential new Member where the
prerequisite for joining the WTO is to become a party to all the
Multilateral Trade Agreements. In practical terms, under the current
regime, all Members, big or small, have similar rights and obligations.
According to the dispute settlement process, all WTO Members are
entitled to the same procedure for a given set of circumstances.
C. The Structural Change
1. The DSB
The WTO dispute settlement system is more precise than the
GATT mechanism. Under the old GATT, panels were established by
the GATT Council, 43 whereas panels under the WTO system are
established by the DSB. The WTO Agreement established the DSB,44
which consists of representatives from all WTO Members who

40
The term “WTO Agreements” includes the agreements and associated legal
instruments included in Annexes 1 and 2 to the WTO Agreement, which are binding
on all Members.
41
See DSU, supra note 22, at art. 1.2.
42
Appellate Body Report, Guatemala—Anti-dumping Investigation Regarding
Portland Cement from Mexico, ¶ 65, WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 2, 1998).
43
“The Council is empowered to act for the CONTRACTING PARTIES, in
accordance with normal GATT practice.” 1979 Annex on the Customary Practice of
the GATT, supra note 4, at ¶ 1, footnote.
44
WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at art. IV:3.
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administer the rules and procedures of the DSU. The DSB deals with
disputes arising out of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to the
DSU45. It also has the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and
Appellate Body reports, and monitor their implementation. Thus the
DSB has been considered as “the General Council acting in another
guise”46 because it consists of representatives of all WTO Members.
More precisely, the DSB is a special body distinct from the General
Council because of the following features: 1) the DSB is a specialized
body, dealing exclusively with dispute settlement issues; 2) the DSB
has its own working procedure distinct from the General Council; 3)
the DSB has a distinct chairmanship; and 4) the representatives of the
Member states may not be the same as those in the General Council.
2. Decisions of the DSB
The decisions of the DSB are adopted by consensus47 if no special
rule exists. This situation follows the established GATT tradition of
decision-making by consensus,48 which is represented in Article IX: 1
of the WTO Agreement.49 In practice, the chairperson of the DSB asks
whether there are any objections to the adoption of a decision, and if
no representative indicates an objection, then the chairperson
announces the adoption of the decision. However, a revolutionary
feature that differs from the old GATT dispute settlement process is
that the most important decisions regarding panel procedure (e.g., the
establishment of panels, the adoption of panel reports, or the
authorization of retaliatory action) are adopted by reverse consensus.
Consequently, in order to block the adoption of a panel report, all
WTO Members, including the complaining party, must vote against its
adoption. 50 This idea will be discussed in further detail under the
“Panel Process” Discussion found in Part III of this Article.
Nevertheless, the power of the DSB to deny the establishment of a
panel or the adoption of a panel report is considered by some to be
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DSU, supra note 22, at 1244, app. 1.
PETER GALLAGHER, GUIDE TO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 6 (Kluwer Law
International, 2002).
47
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 2.4 n.1. Provides that a decision is taken if no
Member, present and voting, formally objects to the proposed decision.
48
WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at art. IX:1 “The WTO shall continue the
practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947.”
49
Id.
50
DSU art. 16.4 specifies that the panel report shall be adopted by the DSB
within sixty days after its circulation to the Members unless a party appeals or the
DSU decides by consensus not to adopt the report. DSU, supra note 22.
46
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“more illusory than real”51 because it is almost impossible for DSB to
do so with the new reverse consensus. Although the DSB plays a
substantial role in the dispute settlement procedure, it is unable to
block the establishment of a panel or the adoption of a report. As a
result, WTO Members play a less active role in the dispute settlement
process than they did within the GATT.
3. Clarification of provisions
Panels are authorized to clarify provisions of the WTO
Agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law. 52 A decision of the DSB to adopt a panel
report binds only the parties to the particular dispute. Article IX:2 of
the WTO Agreement provides that only the Ministerial Conference
and the General Council of the WTO have “exclusive authority” to
adopt interpretations of the WTO Agreement. 53 Therefore, if WTO
Members do not agree with the legal reasoning made by a panel, they
may ask for an “authoritative interpretation” under Article IX:2 of the
WTO Agreement, which is binding on all WTO Members, and on
every panel when applying the provision to future cases.
D. The Scope of the DSU
1. Ratione materiae: what agreements does the WTO cover?
The WTO Agreements contain considerably more legal
obligations than the old GATT, such as trade-in services and traderelated aspects of intellectual property rights.54 Basically, the scope of
the DSU is much broader than its GATT counterparts of Articles XXII
and XIII.55 The DSU applies to disputes arising out of the provisions
of the “covered agreements” listed in Appendix 1 to the DSU56 and
includes the Multilateral Agreements on the Trade in Goods, 57

51

Id.
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.2.
53
See WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at art. IX:2.
54
The WTO Agreements also contain a number of new obligations related to
trade in goods such as obligations concerning trade-related investment measures
(TRIMS), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), trade in agriculture and textile.
55
GATT, supra note 1, at arts. XXII, XIII.
56
See DSU, supra note 22, app. 1.
57
These are: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; Agreement on
Agriculture; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures;
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade;
52
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“General Agreement on Trade in Services” (GATS), 58 and
“Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”
(TRIPS).59 Additionally, the DSU applies to disputes arising out of the
WTO Agreement60 and the DSU itself.61
It is worth noting that the DSU may also apply to disputes related
to the Plurilateral Trade Agreements (PTA) in Annex 4 of the WTO
Agreement, 62 if the parties to each of these agreements adopt a
decision setting out the terms for the application of the DSU to the
individual agreement. 63 The parties are also required to notify the
DSB of the decision taken.64 Because of this specific feature of the
application of the DSU to the PTA, the term “covered agreements”
may not always include the PTA. Where the DSB administers dispute
settlement issues under a PTA, only Members that are parties to that
Agreement may participate in decisions or actions taken by the DSB
with respect to that dispute.
In sum, the inclusion of all of the aforementioned agreements in
the DSU illustrates the WTO dispute settlement system is significantly
broader in scope than the old GATT Articles XXII and XIII.

Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures; Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; Agreement on
Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994;
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection; Agreement on Rules of Origin; Agreement on
Import Licensing Procedures; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures;
Agreement on Safeguards.
58
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1168
(1994) [hereinafter GATS].
59
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex
1C to the WTO Agreement, 33 I.L.M. 1997 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
60
See WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at arts. I–XIV.
61
DSU, supra note 22, at 1226, art. 1.1.
62
Those are the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and the Agreement on
Government Procurement. In contrast with the Multilateral Trade Agreements, which
are binding on all WTO Members, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements are binding only
on those Members that have accepted them and do not create either obligations or
rights for the Members that have not accepted them. The International Dairy
Agreement and the International Bovine Meat Agreement, which were also included
in Annex 4, were terminated at the end of 1997.
63
The Committee on Government Procurement has taken such a decision. See
Notification under Appendix 1 of the DSU, Communication from the Chairman of the
Committee on Government Procurement, WT/DSB/7 (July 12, 1996).
64
See DSU, supra note 22, at 1244, app. 1.
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2. Ratione personae: who is subject to the WTO?
The WTO Panel Procedure remains as an intergovernmental
dispute settlement mechanism whereby only WTO Members may be
parties or third parties in a panel process to a trade dispute arising out
of a covered agreement. In addition to states, separate custom
territories that possess full autonomy of their external commercial
relations may also be parties to the WTO Agreement and may become
WTO Members. 65 Consequently, Member states and territories can
bring forth panel proceedings or be a respondent or third party in a
trade dispute.66 For example, although the European Communities did
not constitute a state, yet it participated in a number of WTO
proceedings.67
The DSU applies not only to measures taken by Member
governments, but actions taken by regional and local governments as
well. In a footnote to Article 4.2 of the Understanding, it states,
“where the provisions of any other covered agreement concerning
measures taken by regional or local governments or authorities within
the territory of a Member contain provisions different from the
provisions of this paragraph, the provisions of such other covered
agreement shall prevail.”67 This Article permits the DSU to cover
actions by regional and local governments. Similarly, the
“Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT
1994”68 stipulates that each Member must take reasonable measures in
ensuring that regional and local governments, as well as authorities
within its territories, observe the provisions of the GATT 1994.
Another multilateral agreement that regulates regional and local
government action is GATS, which provides in Article I:3 that:
For the purpose of this Agreement:
(a) “measures by Members” means measures taken by:

65

WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at art. XII:1.
Also note that a metropolitan customs territory of a GATT Contracting Party,
though not a party to the GATT, was treated as though it were a Contracting Party for
the purposes of the territorial application of the agreement (GATT Art. XXIV). For
this reason, GATT Contracting Parties could initiate panel proceedings on behalf of
non-member entities—for instance, the Netherlands brought a claim against the US on
behalf of the Netherlands Antilles in 1994. Because the old GATT is a part of the
GATT 1994, this situation still prevails under the new regime. However, GATT 1994
is legally distinct from the old GATT 1947.
66

67

DSU, supra note 22, at art. 4.2 n.3.
Understanding of the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, ¶¶ 13
and 14, reprinted in 2 ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, 793–
94 (WTO 1995).
68
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(i) central, regional or local governments and
authorities; and
(ii) non-governmental bodies in the exercise of
powers delegated by central, regional or local
governments or authorities;
In fulfilling its obligations and commitments under the
Agreement, each Member shall take such reasonable
measures as may be available to it to ensure their
observance by regional and local governments and
authorities and non-governmental bodies within its
territory.
The GATS places Members under the additional obligation of not
only ensuring that the central, regional and local authorities are
upholding the GATT 1994, but that the non-governmental bodies
exercising powers on behalf of the noted authorities are in compliance
as well. Therefore, the WTO system regulates this issue in more detail
and encompasses a broader scope ratione personae than its
predecessor.69
III. THE PANEL PROCESS
A. Establishment of Panels
It is easier to establish panels under the WTO than it is under the
old GATT. Through the new rule of reverse consensus, the WTO
establishes panels without the delays encountered under the GATT. In
order to reject the establishment of a panel, all WTO Members,
including the complaining party, must vote against establishment. The
respondent may not delay the establishment beyond the second
meeting of the DSB after the request appears on its agenda by virtue of
Article 6.1 of the DSU.70 If a complaining party so requests, a meeting
of the DSB shall convene specifically for this purpose within fifteen
days of the request as long as notice is given ten days prior to the
meeting.71
Parties address panel requests to the Chairman of the DSB. The
request must indicate whether consultations were held, must specify

69

TRIPS does not contain any provisions in this respect, since intellectual
property rights are normally within the competences of the central, rather than the
regional or local authorities.
70
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 6.1.
71
Id. at art. 6.1, footnote.
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the measures at issue, and must provide a brief summary of the legal
basis of the complaint. The request must contain the terms of
reference, which define the scope of the dispute and the panel’s
jurisdiction. Proper elaboration of the terms of reference is vital not
only to start the panel proceedings, but also for its outcome.
Under the old GATT, a panel could be established only if
consensus among all Contracting Parties existed; therefore, the
respondent could easily block the establishment of a panel in the
GATT Council. However, in practice this delay continued for only a
few GATT Council meetings. 72 Until 1987, the longest debate to
establish a panel took four council meetings, 73 which may be
explained by the GATT Contracting Parties’ desire to respect
obligations set forth under the agreement. GATT Members understood
that if one violates a rule, another Member would equally do so to the
detriment of the former. This is a logical result in both the GATT
international trade regime and now in the WTO, where reciprocity of
the obligations plays a vital role. Thus under the GATT, the political
pressure stemming from violations was sometimes enormous, and
deterred future violations even more successfully than a legal
obligation. As late as 1989, the 1989 Contracting Parties’ Decision74
recognized a complainant’s right to a panel by introducing reverse
consensus. This decision was applied on a provisional basis, and the
DSU fortunately reaffirmed this right.
B. Composition of Panels
The WTO Secretariat maintains a list from which panel Members
are selected. However, it is not necessary to be on the list to be a
potential panel member in a particular dispute. Article 8.3 of the DSU
forbids a potential panel member from serving on a panel if he or she
is a citizen of a Member-state party to the dispute, or a citizen of a
third party, unless the parties agree otherwise.75 This rule originated
from the old GATT dispute settlement process. Because most disputes
involve economic powers such as the United States, the European
Community, and Japan, P. Pescatore argues that this practice within
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Petersmann, supra note 13.
Plank, supra note 15, at 64.
74
The decision was agreed at a Ministerial Meeting in Montreal, Canada as early
as December 9, 1988. However, it was formally adopted on April 12, 1989 because
the ministers awaited the finalization of some other agreements (including textiles and
agriculture). Its formal name is Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules
and Procedures, Decision of 12 April 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61 (1989).
75
See DSU, supra note 22, at art. 8.3.
73
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the GATT acted as a “de facto ban” on publicly known trade
specialists from these states.76 The same argument could be said for
the WTO dispute settlement system.
Third-party participation in the panel proceedings has increased
under the WTO.77 However, some disputes involving numerous third
parties significantly reduce the number of trade experts who may
potentially serve as panel members because of the application of
Article 8.3. The DSB gives Members ten days to give notice of their
interest in the matter and of their intentions of being third parties.
After the deadline expires, the disputing parties and the Secretariat
may proceed with the negotiations on the panel composition.
The DSU contains detailed rules on the composition of panels and
clarifies the role of the Director-General if the parties fail to agree on
the panel's composition. Unlike the WTO, which allows well-qualified
non-government individuals to serve on panels, only government
officials served in the panels in the first years of the GATT. Within the
GATT, panelist selection carried great significance and required
approval by both parties. This created concerns that a panelist may
favor a particular party. Paragraph 11 of the 1979 Understanding
specifies that “the members of a panel would preferably be
governmental.”78 The 1979 Annex on the Customary Practice of the
GATT states that as of 1979, there are only a few cases in which
parties agreed to designate non-government experts, considering “the
nature and complexity of the matter.”79 Notably, government officials
from GATT delegations in Geneva may find it difficult to ignore their
own governments’ economic and political interests, 80 and this may
impact the outcome of the panel process. When career diplomats serve
as panelists, they may over-emphasize conciliation instead of reaching
legal interpretations based on legal norms. 81 With the growing
complexity of the rules contained within the GATT framework, the
participation of independent trade experts on the panels became

76
Pierre Pescatore, The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Its Present
Situation and its Prospects, 10 J. INT'L ARB. 27, 30 (1993).
77
For example, in EC—Bananas III, as many as twenty-three parties participated
in the panel proceedings. See European Communities—Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997: II 589 (Sept. 9, 1997).
78
Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 212, ¶11 (1980).
79
Annex on Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the
Field of Dispute Settlement GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 217, ¶ 6(iii) (1980).
80
There have even been instances in the old GATT system in which
governments tried to exercise pressure on panelists. In one case, a panelist resigned.
See Plank, supra note 15, at 81–82.
81
See Eichmann, supra note 27, at 52.
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inevitable. The situation changed with the introduction of a roster of
non-government panelists in 1984. As in the GATT, WTO panelists
serve in their individual capacities and are not permitted to receive
instructions or be influenced regarding panel matters.
The time-limits set by the DSU do not allow the parties to delay
the formation of a panel, which may comprise of three or five
Members. Parties may agree on the composition of a five-member
panel within ten days from the establishment of the panel. Panelists
“are selected by the parties to examine the particular dispute.” 82
Indeed, in most cases, the parties select the panelists, but this is not
always the case. The DSU requires the WTO Secretariat to propose
panelists. Parties cannot oppose such proposals except for “compelling
reasons.” 83 Thus panel composition remains a peculiarity,
distinguishing the GATT and WTO dispute settlement mechanism
from arbitration. Judge P. Pescatore emphasizes that the DirectorGeneral of GATT, not the parties, proposed the nominations. In his
view, this appointment procedure gave panelists “the consciousness of
being vested with a mandate emanating from the whole of the GATT
community.” 84 Within WTO, this function has remained almost
unchanged. While parties may suggest panelists, the WTO Secretariat
finalizes the panel’s composition. If the parties cannot agree on who
will serve in the panel within twenty days of the establishment of the
panel, each party can request the Director-General to appoint its
Members. The request shall be made before the Chairman of the DSB
who has to notify the Director-General. The latter selects the panelists
in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB, the Chairman of the
relevant council or committee, and the parties to the dispute. The
Chairman of the DSB shall inform the parties about the panel
composition no later than ten days after he or she receives the request.
The requirement embodied in the Decision on Certain Dispute
Settlement Procedures for the General Agreement on Trade in
Services85 improves the quality of panel reports. It takes into account
the specific nature of the obligations and commitments in the
Agreement regarding dispute settlement and establishes a special
roster of panelists. The panelists from the roster may be governmental
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GALLAGHER, supra note 46, at 27.
Though in practice Members seem to interpret this provision broadly and
oppose nominations very often.
84
Pescatore, supra note 76, at 30–31.
85
Ministerial Decision adopted by the Trade Negotiations Committee on
December 15, 1993. The text of the decision can be found in: THE LEGAL TEXTS. THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 401
(Cambridge University Press & WTO 1999).
83
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or non-governmental individuals with experience in issues related to
GATT and/or trade in services. The Decision requires panel members
in sectoral matters to possess the necessary expertise concerning the
sector involved.
In accordance with Article 3.1 of the DSU,86 the WTO continues
the GATT practice of providing preferential treatment to developing
countries. Upon request, the DSU will require one panelist from a
developing country to be included in the formation of a panel in
disputes involving a developing country and a developed country. This
provision ensures the independence of panel members and further
guarantees that the panel will not issue a power-oriented report.
C. Consultations
The consultations procedure acts as a mandatory first step to the
dispute settlement process and is further developed and codified by the
DSU. In order to start the panel procedure, a trade dispute must exist.
A dispute is defined as a difference of views between WTO Members
concerning their rights and obligations under the “covered
agreements” where one member alleges that an action, regulation, or
policy (a “measure”) of another member is damaging its interests
under the WTO Agreements. However, the existence of a difference
by itself is not sufficient to start the procedure. A WTO dispute arises
only if the complaining party notifies the DSB and the relevant
councils and committees under Article 4.3 of the DSU. The DSU
requires written requests for consultations stating the reasons for the
request, the measures at issue, and the legal basis for the complaint.87
The consultation aims at helping disputants reach a mutually
acceptable solution; however, consultations must be conducted in good
faith before resorting to any further action under the DSU, and
Members should attempt to obtain satisfactory adjustment of the
matter. 88 Within the panel process, the consultation gives the
disputants an opportunity to exchange relevant information and to
express their opinions.
In contrast, the wording of the old GATT Article XXIII:1 89
implies that consultations were not a prerequisite for the establishment
of a panel. However, the 1979 Understanding, codifying the GATT
customary practice, clarifies this misunderstanding by requiring
consultations before resorting to the establishment of a panel. Under
86
87
88
89

98

DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.1.
Id at art. 6.2, ¶¶ 1 and 2.
Id. art. 4.5.
GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXIII:1.
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the GATT 1994, consultations may be initiated either pursuant to
Article XXII:1 or XXIII:1. 90 If consultations are requested under
Article XXIII:1 of GATT 1994, the complainant excludes the
possibility of other Members participating in the consultations.
However, if the request is made pursuant to Article XXII:1 of GATT
1994, other Members with “substantial trade interest” in the matter
may join the consultations if the respondent accepts them. Other
multilateral agreements, such as GATS Article XXII:2 and Article 4,
paragraphs 1 to 4, of the “Subsidies and Countervailing Agreement,”91
etc., also provide for consultations.
Compared to the consultations held within the old GATT, the new
mechanism is more formalized. One improvement of the DSU is the
time limit prescribed for consultation, in which a Member must
respond to a request for consultations within ten days, and is required
to enter into consultations within thirty days. If the consultations do
not settle a dispute within sixty days from the receipt of the request,
the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel.
Furthermore, if the consulting parties jointly decide that the
consultations cannot settle the dispute, then the complaining party is
not required to wait for the sixty-day period to run. Likewise, if the
Member concerned does not respond within ten days of the request, or
does not enter into negotiations within thirty days of the receipt of the
request, the complaining party may proceed directly to request the
establishment of a panel.
The DSU also provides shorter time limits for consultations in
cases of urgency, such as disputes arising over perishable goods. The
disputing parties have a duty to “accelerate the proceedings to the
greatest extent possible”92 not only during the consultations, but also
during the panel process. Members must enter into negotiations within
a period of ten days after the receipt of the request for consultation and
proceed to the establishment of a panel if consultations do not settle
the dispute within twenty days of the request.
The consultations are made without prejudice to the right of any
Member in relation to the panel process; therefore, a complaint cannot
use confidential information it received in the panel procedure as
evidence against the respondent; however, the provision of Article
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GATT 1994, Annex 1 A to the WTO, April 15, 1994, 33 ILM 1154 (1994).
E.g., the Subsidies and Countervailing Agreement provides additional
requirements for consultations to those stated in the DSU.
92
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 4.9.
91
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4.693 should not be interpreted literally. If the disputants have kept a
record of the topics addressed, they may use the record in the panel
process as necessary evidence to assist the panel in concluding
precisely what the consultations have covered.
D. Terms of Reference and Panels’ Jurisdiction
Although the old GATT did not provide any details on terms of
reference, the 1979 Understanding improves and provides that the
terms of reference are “to examine the matter and to make such
findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the
recommendations or rulings provided for in paragraph 2 of Article
XXIII.”94 The DSU codifies and complements the GATT practice on
this matter. Similarly, the standard terms of reference within the WTO
provides that a panel shall examine the matter in light of the relevant
provisions of the covered agreements and shall make such findings as
will assist the DSB.95 The verb assist fits better under the old GATT
because within the WTO, the reverse consensus rule for adoption of
reports, panels, and the Appellate Body do more than merely assist the
DSB.
The terms of reference define the precise claim and determine
what matters the panel is authorized to issue its report, e.g., on what
subject and against which party. The panel is required to mention the
measure complained of (governmental measure, regulation, law, or
policy), and the legal basis of the claim (the provisions of the covered
agreements concerned).
The terms of reference also contain a notifying function, providing
the respondent and the third parties in the panel process sufficient
information of the claim in order to respond. No factual finding needs
to be stated in the terms of reference because the claimant has the
burden to prove or the respondent has the burden to rebut the facts of
the case during the panel process.
As a procedural matter, Article 6.2 of the DSU 96 requires the
complainant to state in the terms of reference whether consultations
were held. The claimant prepares the terms of reference based on the
matters discussed. Without prior consultations, a panel request may be
dismissed because consultations are a first and mandatory step before

93

DSU, supra note 22, at art. 4.6. Article 4.6 provides that, “[c]onsultations shall
be confidential, and without prejudice to the rights of any Member in any further
proceedings.”
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1979 Annex on the Customary Practice of the GATT, supra note 4, at ¶ 6(ii).
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WTO Agreement, supra note 3, Annex 2.
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DSU, supra note 22, at art. 6.2.

100

WINTER 2006

PANEL PROCEDURES

the panel process can even commence. Nevertheless, panels have no
legal duty to make ex officio97 an enquiry on whether consultations
have actually taken place because a case may be heard in the absence
of consultations, so long as the respondent does not object. It is
possible that consultations have not taken place because the Member
failed to provide an answer within the ten day requirement or did not
enter into consultations within the thirty day requirement. In such
cases, the claimant may proceed directly to the establishment of a
panel, but must explain the reason why consultations had not taken
place. Direct resort to a panel will also be authorized if the other
Member refuses consultations or if the disputants jointly decide that
consultations will not resolve the matter.
Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that a “brief summary of the legal
basis of the complaint” and an identification of the specific measures
at issue be provided in the terms of reference.98 This means that the
relevant legal provisions should be stated in a specific and clear
manner, allowing the respondent to organize a proper defense. For
instance, since some of the provisions of GATT 1994 contain large
compilations, a mere allegation of a violation of Article III will not
fulfill the requirement for specificity under DSU Article 6.2. 99
Specificity functions as a vital part of due process and the
establishment of the defense by the respondent. Complainants must
cite the relevant provisions of the covered agreements and refrain from
positing arguments in the terms of reference to support their position.
They must also understand the difference between a “claim” and an
“argument.” A claim embodies an allegation that the respondent
violated a specific provision of a covered agreement. In contrast,
complainants put forth arguments to demonstrate the respondent’s
violation of a specific provision. The claim is contained in the terms of
reference, while the arguments support the claim and may be advanced
until the end of the panel hearings.100
The DSU does not demand exact identity between the specific
measures identified in the request for consultations and those

97
The term ex officio designates powers exercised by officials by virtue or
because of the office they hold.
98
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 6.2.
99
Id.
100
Appellate Body Report, Korea—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of
Certain Dairy Products, ¶ 139, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) (adopted Jan. 12,
2000).
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mentioned in the request for a panel. 101 Obviously, a measure
unrelated to the consultations will not fulfill the mandatory
consultation required before resorting to a panel; however, parties may
subsequently readjust their scope of reference if new facts are
discovered during consultations. These additional measures should
correlate with the main issue that is subject to consultations. A request
for the establishment of a panel on a matter, which is different from
that discussed in the consultations, will likely be inadmissible, but will
be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Though ambiguous, Article 7.2 of the DSU102 requires panels to
address the relevant provisions in the covered agreements cited by the
parties to the dispute. Panels will consider the provisions mentioned in
the terms of reference since the terms submitted by the complainant
limit the panel’s jurisdiction. For this reason, a panel may not go
beyond the subject of the terms of reference, and consider whether
measures or actions complained of are inconsistent with other
provisions of the covered agreements that are not cited. Even though
some provisions are not mentioned in the terms of reference or raised
during the proceedings, they can be considered by the panel, e.g.,
concerning special treatment of developing countries. 103 Similarly,
when a complaint alleges a violation of a number of WTO provisions,
panels are not obliged to address all the cited provisions. A panel may
sufficiently address only those claims necessary to resolve the dispute,
resulting in the exercise of judicial economy.
A measure not mentioned in the terms of reference but that
appears in a written submission is admissible if it is closely related to
the measure involved, and if the respondent is given notice according
to due process requirements.104 However, the panel will not consider
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This was re-affirmed by Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Export Financing
Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 132, WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) (adopted Aug. 20,
1999).
102
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 7.2.
103
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 12.11. The DSU requires that panels “shall
explicitly indicate the form in which account has been taken of the relevant provisions
on differential and more favourable treatment for developing country Members.”
104
Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and
Paper, ¶ 10.8, WT/DS44/AB/R (Jan. 30, 1998) (adopted April 22, 1998).The panel
noted:

[t]o fall within the terms of Article 6.2, it seems clear that a
“measure” not explicitly described in a panel request must have
a clear relationship to a “measure” that is specifically described
therein, so that it can be said to be “included” in the specified
“measure.” In our view, the requirements of Article 6.2 would
be met in the case of a “measure” that is subsidiary or so
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an unrelated measure in a written submission. With regard to nonviolation complaints, if the request for the establishment of a panel
fails to explicitly mention Article XXIII:1(b), the non-violation
complaint will be excluded from the terms of reference. The WTO’s
advantage over the old GATT system lies in the fact that the complaint
requires no consent from the respondent. Under the old GATT, the
terms of reference had to be agreed upon by the parties, which
provided a good incentive for the respondent to delay the proceedings.
For example, in Japan – Agricultural Products, Japan refused to
accept the standard terms of reference due to concerns that “the panel
would follow strictly legal reasoning, without including the relevant
political considerations.”105 Therefore, the value of the DSU rests in
its recognition of the right of the complainant to use standard terms of
reference regardless of the respondent's consent under Article 6.3.
The essential significance of the terms of reference is well
illustrated by an example from EC–Tariff Preferences.106 This marks
the first case submitted to the WTO dispute settlement system
concerning tariff preferences for developing countries. The
Contracting Parties' Decision on Differential and More Favourable
Treatment was adopted in 1979. 107 Before this case, the precise
relationship between GATT Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause,
embodied in the Decision on More Favourable Treatment, was
unclear. Normally, when a provision makes an exception to the
substantive provisions of covered agreements, the burden of proof
rests on the party who invokes the application of such an exception.
Articles XX and XXI of GATT 1994 contain examples of these types
of exceptions. Thus in preparing its claim, the complainant likely
views the Enabling Clause as an exception, and consequently fails to
mention it in the terms of reference.

closely related to a “measure” specifically identified, that the
responding party can reasonably be found to have received
adequate notice of the scope of the claims asserted by the
complaining party.
105
Report of the Panel, Japan—Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural
Products, L/6253, (Nov. 18, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 163 (1989).
106
Panel Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries (EC— Tariff Preferences), WT/DS246/R (Oct.
28, 2003).
107
GATT Secretariat, Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity,
and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979)
[hereinafter Decision on More Favourable Treatment].
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In this case, the Appellate Body reversed the finding of the panel
as to who bore the burden of proof regarding the Enabling Clause. The
Appellate Body observed that:
[A] complaining party challenging a measure taken
pursuant to the Enabling Clause must allege more
than mere inconsistency of the GATT 1994, for to do
only that would not convey the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. In
other words, it is insufficient in the WTO dispute
settlement for a complainant to allege inconsistency
with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 if the complainant
seeks also to argue that the measure is not justified
under the Enabling Clause.108
Thus if the complainant does not identify the Enabling Clause in
its claim, the panel lacks authority to find a violation of that clause not
mentioned in the terms of reference. Therefore, parties should
anticipate all possible scenarios and write them into the terms of
reference.
One of the panelists in a dissenting opinion, 109 however, stated
that the claim had not been brought under the proper provisions and
had to be dismissed. In his/her view, the Enabling Clause was not an
affirmative defense to GATT Article I:1; rather, the complainant bore
the burden of proving a violation of the Enabling Clause.110 Therefore,
the complaint had to be brought not under GATT Article I:1, but under
the Enabling Clause. In practical terms, India would have lost its case
if this view had been shared by a majority of the panel.
The jurisdiction of WTO panels is a significant feature in the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism because the panel’s jurisdiction
determines and limits the scope of the Appellate Body. The DSU
stipulates that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Body “shall be limited
to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations
developed by the panel.” 111 The Appellate Body has stated on
numerous occasions that a panel’s consideration of the evidence,

108

Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, ¶ 110, WT/DS246/AB/R
(Apr. 4, 2004) (adopted April 20, 2004).
109
See Panel Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (EC—Tariff Preferences), WT/DS246/R
(Dec. 1, 2003) (dissenting opinion by one member of the panel, at 152–157).
110
Id. at 156–59.
111
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 17.6.
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including its decision on whether a prima facie case has been
established, falls outside the scope of the appeal proceedings. The
Appellate Body only reviews issues of law. Appellate proceedings do
not normally examine factual issues; therefore, an issue not covered by
the panel analysis will normally fall outside the scope of appellate
review.
In some instances, the Appellate Body has refused to “complete
the legal analysis” when the facts had been gathered in the panel
process. The panel in EC – Asbestos 112 found that the “prohibitive
part” of the French Decree did not fall within the scope of the
“Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade” (TBT).113 However, its
articles providing exceptions to the asbestos ban did fall within the
TBT. The Appellate Body reversed the panel’s finding that the TBT
Agreement did not apply to the part of the Decree regarding the
asbestos ban and concluded that the measure, viewed as an integrated
whole, constituted a technical regulation under the TBT Agreement.
Hence, both the ban itself and the exceptions provided in the French
Decree fell within the scope of the TBT. Normally, one would think
that the Appellate Body could have completed the legal analysis and
examined the consistency of the measure with the TBT agreement;
however, the Appellate Body refused to complete the legal analysis.
Finally, the Appellate Body came to the conclusion that, “[w]ith this
particular collection of circumstances in mind, we consider that we do
not have an adequate basis properly to examine Canada's claims under
Article 2.1, 2.2, 2.4 and 2.8 of the TBT Agreement and, accordingly,
we refrain from so doing.”114 It seems that, among other reasons, the
major concern of the Appellate Body was the “novel character” of the
TBT Agreement. It is evident that the disputing parties advanced the
necessary facts in the panel and appeal proceedings, and that the
claimant (Canada) made its claims under the TBT Agreement.
Therefore, the Appellate Body’s conclusion contradicts the wellestablished principle of law Jura novit curia (it is up to the court to
know the law).115 Furthermore, whether the panel did not make any

112

Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos Containing Products (EC-Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, DSR 2001:VIII,
3305 [hereinafter Measures Affecting Asbestos].
113
Agreement to Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Annex 1 to the WTO
Agreement, supra note 3 [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
114
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000) (adopted
April 5, 2001).
115
For an in-depth analysis of the EC–Asbestos case, the application of the TBT
Agreement, and a critical approach to the Appellate Body’s findings, see Joost
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findings on the issue or not is contestable because it held that the
“prohibitive part” of the decree did not fall within the scope of the
TBT Agreement, while the exceptions did.
This example illustrates the importance of the scope of panel
jurisdiction and the significance of parties making precise requests and
arguments to the panel during panel proceedings. If a party has not
given all pertinent facts during the panel proceedings, they will be
unable to do so during the appeal procedure. Even if a party has
presented certain facts and arguments, the Appellate Body may find
itself unable to complete the legal analysis.
E. Types of Complaints
Analysis of the varying types of complaints illustrates that the
WTO dispute settlement system is broader than other international
dispute settlement systems, which adjudicate only violations of
agreements. The intent to maintain the negotiated balance of
concessions and benefits between WTO Members demonstrates the
peculiarity of the system.116
Although the conditions for the submission of a legal complaint
are provided in the DSU, the legal basis for a complaint is the alleged
violation of individually covered agreements. The WTO Agreement
clearly illustrates that the GATT 1994 is “legally distinct” from the
GATT 1947,117 but the grounds to bring a complaint under the GATT
1994 are technically the same as the requirements indicated in Article
XXIII of the GATT 1947. This is because the reference to “contracting
party” in the provisions of GATT 1994 bears the same meaning as
“member” in Article XXIII of the GATT 1947. Article XXIII, which
has been the basis of the development of the old GATT dispute
settlement mechanism for more than 47 years, remains unchanged in
the GATT 1994. It provides for three kinds of complaints: (1)
violation complaints, (2) non-violation complaints, and (3) situation
complaints.

Pauwelyn, Cross-agreement Complaints before the Appellate Body: A Case Study of
the EC-Asbestos Dispute, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 63 (2002).
116
HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 31.
117
The GATT 1994 consists of: GATT 1947; a number of legal instruments that
have entered into force under the GATT 1947 before the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement such as protocols and certifications relating to tariff concessions,
protocols of accession, decisions on waivers granted under Article XXV of GATT
1947; and decisions of the contracting parties to GATT 1947. It also includes six
interpretation understandings and the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994.
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1. Violation complaints
“Violation complaints” require failure on the part of another
Member to carry out its obligations, which results in nullification or
impairment of a benefit or impediment of the attainment of any
objective.118 The complainant must contend that another Member has
failed to carry out its obligations under GATT 1994. For example, that
a violation of a rule has occurred, which causes an impairment (or
nullification) of the benefits of a covered agreement. 119 Once a
Member establishes a breach of a WTO obligation, the breach triggers
the presumption that the violation causes nullification or impairment
of benefits. Consequently, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent,
who must rebut the charge. This presumption relates only to the result
which a measure causes. For example, if a measure is in violation of a
WTO rule, it is presumed that it results in nullification or impairment
of benefits or impedes the objective of a covered agreement. Thus a
complainant must demonstrate a prima facie violation of a provision of
GATT 1994.
Only then does the presumption that such violation causes
nullification or impairment of benefits arise. 120 The wording of the
provision codified in paragraph 5 of the 1979 Annex on the Customary
Practice to GATT and embodied in Article 3.8 of the DSU implies that
the presumption is rebuttable;121 however, this has never been done,
neither within the old GATT nor the WTO.
2. Non-violation complaints
“Non-violation complaints” require the existence of a measure
applied by another WTO Member, even if it does not conflict with
GATT 1994, provided that it results in “nullification or impairment of
a benefit.”122 The complexities of international trade relations explain
such basis for a complaint. The provision aims at securing the balance
of concessions between WTO Members, since a trade commitment

118

See Art. XXIII:1, GATT 1994, Annex 1 A to the WTO, 33 ILM 1154 (1994).
Or respectively a violation which causes an impediment of the attainment of
any objective of the agreement. However, this second cause of action has been used
significantly less often in the old GATT and now in the WTO.
120
This presumption was codified in the 1979 Annex on the Customary Practice
to GATT. See 1979 Annex on the Customary Practice to GATT, supra note 4, at ¶ 5.
The DSU embodies the presumption in Article 3.8. See DSU, supra note 22, at art.
3.8.
121
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.8.
122
GATT 1994, at art. XXIII:1(b).
119
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may be frustrated, not only by a measure which is in breach of a WTO
rule, but also by a measure consistent with the covered agreements.
State responsibility for injurious acts, which are not prohibited by
international law, is subject to debate.123 In WTO law, the situation is
somewhat different. Article 26.1 of the DSU extends and develops the
relevant GATT provision. Non-violation complaints were admitted in
the old GATT and rightly remain admissible in the new dispute
settlement mechanism. The WTO, on the other hand, has a more
complete set of rules and may fill gaps when a measure otherwise not
prohibited by the agreements impairs trade benefits. The burden to
prove “non-violation” complaints is heavier. Three conditions must be
proved: (1) the application of a measure by a WTO Member, (2) the
existence of a benefit under a WTO agreement, 124 and (3) the
nullification or impairment of a benefit due to the application of the
measure.125
Additionally, the complainant has to present a “detailed
justification” to support the claim and must explicitly state in the terms
of reference that the claim relates to Article XXIII: 1(b). The panel can
only recommend an adjustment and not a withdrawal of the measure.
It is noteworthy that the Panel in Japan – Photographic Film and
Paper inferred that a “non-violation complaint” must refer to some
actual harm to the complainant since, in any event, the latter must
demonstrate that the measure does in fact result in nullification or
impairment of expected benefits. 126 In contrast, a “violation
complaint” does not require proof from the complainant of actual harm
because of the presumption mentioned above. There were only twentyfour non-violation cases from 1947 to 1990 within the old GATT; only

123

The ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility provide that every
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that
State. The articles further provide that if the conduct of a state constitutes a breach of
an international obligation, there is an internationally wrongful act. See Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No.10), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
124
GATT jurisprudence has linked such a benefit with reasonable expectations
for improved market opportunities due to the concession granted. However, this
condition poses a number of legal problems. It is an open question whether such
reasonable expectations may be attributable to a third country which did not actually
negotiate the tariff concession with the complainant. Likewise, it is unclear how long
such expectations would last. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 364 (3d ed. 1995).
125
This is due to the fact that the presumption of “nullification and impairment
of benefits” applicable to “violation complaints” does not apply to “non-violation” and
“situation complaints.”
126
Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and
Paper, ¶ 10.60, WT/DS44/AB/R (Mar. 31, 1998) (adopted Apr. 22, 1998).
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seven resulted in affirmative panel rulings, and only three were
adopted by the GATT Council.
3. Situation complaints
“Situation complaints,” listed in Article XXIII:1(c) of GATT
1994, regard any situation that results in “nullification or impairment
of a benefit” (or impediment for the attainment of the objective of the
agreement). 127 They cover “any other situation” act, or omission,
different from a measure, which does not infringe on a provision of
GATT 1994 or other covered agreements. Situation complaints have
been designed to eliminate possible non-tariff barriers to trade. No
GATT panel has ever based its legal finding on such a claim under the
GATT. Trade experts have criticized the availability of “situation
complaints” in GATT 1994. Taking into account the vague language
of GATT Article XXIII:1(c) and the “lack of predictable and
justifiable standards for interpreting,” E.-U. Petersmann considers this
imprecise type of complaint useless and supports its formal
abolition. 128 P. Pescatore suggests that the “legal fantasy” called
“situation complaints” should be erased.129 However, the WTO system
did not abolish this type of complaint, but provided some additional
requirements. Except for a detailed justification provided by the
complainant, if a case also involves matters other than those related to
a situation complaint, Article 26.2(b) of the DSU requires that the
panel issue a report addressing those matters (i.e., those regarding a
violation or a non-violation complaint) and a separate report on the
matters that specifically concern the “situation complaint.”
Additionally, the DSU prescribes a special procedure for
“situation complaints,” which was applied during the last years of the
old GATT on a provisional basis pursuant to the 1989 Contracting
Parties’ Decision.130 The general procedure provided for in the DSU
is applicable only until the panel report is circulated to the parties.
However, the special procedure provided in the Decision applies to the
subsequent stages following the completion of the panel report; i.e.,
these special rules apply in lieu of the DSU with regard to adoption,
surveillance, and implementation of a consensual panel report on a

127

GATT 1994, at art. XXIII:1(c).
Petersmann, supra note 8, at 173–76.
129
Pescatore, supra note 76, at 41. But see GALLAGHER, supra note 46, at 17
(finding that not only “situation complaints,” but also “non-violation complaints” are
“exotic”).
130
Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures (Apr.
12, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61 (1989).
128
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“situation complaint.” Therefore, the adoption of a panel report on a
situation complaint under the current regime requires the positive
consensus of all WTO Members. Considering all these peculiarities
regarding “situation complaints,” it is likely that these types of
complaints will not arise in the near future.
The possibility of bringing a “non-violation” or “situation
complaint” indicates that the WTO dispute settlement is broader than
other international dispute settlement systems, which adjudicate only
violations of agreements. The peculiarity of the system is explained by
the intent to maintain the negotiated balance of concessions and
benefits between WTO Members. 131 The three types of complaints
mentioned above, “violation,” “non-violation,” and “situation
complaints,” may allege that a measure has caused either “nullification
or impairment of a benefit” or “impediment for the attainment of the
objective of the GATT.” 132 Since these three types of actions may
result in two different consequences independently of each other, E.U. Petersmann finds six different types of complaints to exist. 133
Nullification is a sub-category of an impairment, since it completely
impairs the benefits from the GATT 1994 or from other covered
agreements.
4. Types of complaints provided in other covered agreements
In addition, there are some differences between the existing WTO
system and the GATT system. The types of complaints provided for in
other multilateral agreements on trade of goods are identical to the
complaints in GATT 1994, as they make references to Articles XXII
and XIII of GATT 1994.134 If a complaint is brought under a covered
agreement other than GATT 1994, the complaint must refer to the
relevant agreement for failure to carry out a WTO obligation or for the
impairment of a benefit.
Under the current regime, a claim can be based not only on an
inconsistency related to the trade of goods, as was the case under the
old GATT, but also on any nullification or impairment of benefits
from agreements of trades in services and intellectual property rights,

131

HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 31.
Art. XXIII:1, GATT 1994, Annex 1 A to the WTO, 33 I.L.M 1154 (1994).
133
Petersmann, supra note 13, at 72–74. However, complaints brought on the
basis of an allegation of “impediment for the attainment of the objective of the GATT”
have been used considerably less frequently within the GATT and now within the
WTO.
134
The Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods are embodied in Annex 1A
to the WTO Agreement, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994).
132
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and on rights related to the WTO Agreement and the DSU. However,
the GATS distinguishes between only two kinds of complaints—
“violation complaints” and “non-violation complaints.”135 The former
does not require nullification or impairment of benefits,136 and thus
there is no need to trigger the presumption of Article 3.8 of the
DSU.137
The “non-violation” complaint under the GATS is technically the
same as that of GATT 1994, except that GATS Article XXIII:3 is
more specific. It requires that an impairment or nullification result in a
benefit, which the Member “could reasonably have expected to accrue
to it under a specific commitment of another Member.” 138 This
condition is elaborated by the GATT jurisprudence on “non-violation”
cases, and GATS Article XXIII:3 currently specifies this condition.
Under GATT 1994 and the old GATT regime, if the claimant
succeeds in proving a non-violation complaint, the respondent is not
obliged to withdraw the measure, but can make an adjustment. In
contrast, GATS Article XXIII:3 provides that a satisfactory adjustment
may include not only a modification of the measure, but also its
withdrawal. Therefore, the GATS offers an additional legal remedy
with regards to non-violation complaints (withdrawal of the measure)
and does not provide for a “situation complaint.”
Although the TRIPS presents the possibility of bringing all types
of complaints provided in Article XXIII of GATT 1994 forward,
Article 64(3) of the TRIPS specifies that the provisions for “nonviolation” and “situation complaints” do not apply in the first five
years of entering into the WTO Agreement. Therefore, the TRIPS
Council is not able to examine the scope and modalities for such
complaints, and may not submit recommendations to the Ministerial
Conference. Even though these recommendations have not been
submitted, WTO Members have brought “non-violation” and
“situation complaints” under the TRIPS.

135
136
137

GATS, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994), at art. XXIII.
See GATS art. XXIII:1, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994) at 1183.
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.8 provides:
In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to
constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that there
is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse
impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement, and in
such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint
has been brought to rebut the charge.

138

GATS art. XXIII:3, supra note 136.
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Finally, a complaint based on a violation of the DSU and the WTO
Agreement is permissible. 139 In a recent case, a claimant alleged a
violation of Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement, 140 but had not
established it during the proceedings. In another recent case, US –
Safeguards,141 the Appellate Body found a violation of Article 11 of
the DSU.
The DSU does not permit counter-claims because the use of
dispute settlement procedures is not considered a “contentious act,”
and complaints and counter-complaints should not be linked.142 For
example, in Mexico – Soft Drinks, as Mexico attempted to link a WTO
dispute to another dispute between the same parties under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the panel emphasized that
under Article 3.10 of the DSU, 143 Members should not link
“complaints and counter-complaints in regard to distinct matters.”144
The object of a complaint may be a “measure” in the sense of a
positive action, such as a violation of a law or regulation, or even a
decision attributable to the government. It may be inaction when a
WTO rule requires a positive action. A “measure” may be any act of a
WTO Member, even if it is not binding, including governmental
administrative guidance.145

139

See WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at arts. I–XIV.
Appellate Body Report, United States–Laws, Regulations and Methodology
for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), ¶ 23, WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18,
2006) (adopted May 9, 2006).
141
Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Wheat Gluten from the EC, ¶ 187, WT/DS166/AB/R (Dec. 22, 2000).
142
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.10, last phrase.
143
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.10.
144
Panel Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, ¶
7.15, WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005).
145
This was confirmed in Japan–Semiconductors. In that case, the Japanese
Government contended that the measures complained of were not restrictions within
the meaning of GATT Article XI:1, because they were not legally binding or
mandatory (¶¶ 106–08). The panel found that non-binding measures would be
operating in a manner equivalent to mandatory requirements, so that the difference
between the measures and mandatory requirements would be “only one of form and
not of substance” (¶ 109). Hence, it concluded that the Japanese Government's
measures did not need to be legally binding to take effect, as there were reasonable
grounds to believe that there were sufficient incentives for Japanese producers and
exporters to conform (¶ 111). Therefore, the Japanese administrative guidance was
found to be in violation of GATT Article XI:1. Report of the Panel, Japan—Trade in
Semi-conductors, ¶¶ 106, 109, L/6309 (May 4, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at
116 (1989).
140
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5. Multiple complaints
Trade measures adopted by a Member often adversely affect
numerous WTO Members. This explains why more than one Member
may request the establishment of a panel on the same subject matter,
i.e., there may be multiple complainants. Article 9.1 of the DSU
provides that, whenever feasible, one single panel should examine
these complaints, taking into account the rights of all complainants.146
However, if a considerable amount of time elapses between the filing
of the different complaints, then the establishment of a single panel is
not feasible.
If several panels have been set up on the same subject matter,
Article 9.3 of the DSU provides that the same individuals should serve
on each of the panels and the timetables should be synchronized.147
This rule aims at providing consistency of legal interpretation in the
panel reports and avoiding contradictory panel rulings on the same
subject matter.
F. Written Submissions and Hearings
The DSU codifies the established practice of GATT panels
regarding panel hearings and written submissions. Article 12 of the
DSU and its Appendix 3 on Working Procedures determine the
procedural phases and time limits from the establishment of a panel
until the issuance of its report. As a general rule, the timeframe may
not exceed six months. In cases of urgency, including those relating to
perishable goods, the panel is required to issue its report to the parties
involved in the dispute within three months. In order to respect the
deadlines of this time-sensitive process, the DSU prescribes rigorous
time limits and establishes control over the panel.
The WTO system’s superior consistency and unification in the
overall function of panels surpasses that of the GATT’s systems.
Panels within the old GATT had to set up their individual working
procedures. As of 1985, panels had to follow the Suggested Working
Procedures, unless the Members of the panel agreed otherwise after
consulting the parties to the dispute. 148 Normally, GATT panels
received two sets of written submissions and held two substantive
meetings with the parties. WTO panels follow the established GATT
practice, which started in the 1980s, after the creation of a Legal
Office within the GATT Secretariat. A legal officer is assigned in each
146
147
148

DSU, supra note 22, at art. 9.1.
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 9.3.
1989 Contracting Parties’ Decision, supra note 23, at ¶ F(f)(2).
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case and attends all panel meetings. Their responsibility is to assist and
advise the panelists on procedural and substantive legal questions.
This practice deserves support since WTO legal officers and
professionals are aware of how all the panels proceed. Furthermore,
legal officers never intervene in the oral meetings unless invited to do
so, but they are limited to only advising the panelist, who take
responsibility in making their final decision.
Within the WTO, a panel first holds a short procedural meeting
(organizational meeting) with the parties, establishing the schedule for
the panel proceedings. The panel decides the time limits on the first
written submissions, the date of the first substantive meeting, the due
dates of written replies to questions by the panel, the date for
submission of the second written statements, the second substantive
meeting, and so forth. Panels are obligated to adopt the working
procedure and the timetable within one week after the panel is
composed.
1. The first written submissions
Under the GATT practice, parties generally submitted their first
written statements simultaneously, but under the WTO, the
complainant must submit the first written submission in advance
(within three to six weeks) of the responding party’s submission.149 In
addition, the DSU in Appendix 3 prescribes detailed working
procedures with strict time limits.150. Both parties have to present the
facts of the case and their arguments in the written submissions. After
receipt of the complaining party’s submission, the respondent has two
or three weeks to transmit its first written submission to the panel. This
sequence of submitting a brief in advance is superior to simultaneous
submission because it allows the respondent to receive notice of the
facts and legal arguments regarding the alleged WTO inconsistency in
order to organize its defense.
The first written submission of the complainant contains more
detailed factual and legal arguments than the request for the
establishment of a panel. A panel has no authority to examine a claim
that was not included in the panel request because it is beyond the
panel’s terms of reference. The purpose of the first submission of the

149

Appendix 3 to the DSU, Working Procedures, supra note 22, at ¶ 12 (a).
Additionally, during the proceedings, panels follow the DSU and the Understandings
and Decisions of the GATT Contracting Parties of 1979, 1982, 1984, and 1989. These
documents (except the DSU) are reproduced in 2 GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE
TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE (WTO 1995), at 632–42.
150
See Appendix 3 to the DSU, Working Procedures, supra note 22.
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complainant is to substantiate the claim advanced, while the
respondent's first written submission is to refute the allegations and
arguments of the complainant. The submissions are kept confidential,
but parties may decide to disclose their submissions to the public
pursuant to Article 18.2 of the DSU.151
2. The first substantive meeting
The WTO system is significantly more open than the GATT
system. After the parties exchange first written submissions, the panel
holds the first substantive meeting within approximately two weeks.
Under the old GATT regime as well as under the WTO, the panel
meetings are not open to the public.152 At the first substantive meeting,
the complainant is asked to present its case, in which the complainant
usually makes an opening statement that describes the history of the
dispute and explains the merits of the case. Then the respondent is
asked to present its point of view. During the presentation, the
respondent advances arguments in order to defend its own measures.
The panelists, usually through the chairman, may ask questions at any
time to clarify certain situations or to ask for more factual information.
After each session, the parties provide each other with copies of their
oral statements.
The Working Procedures is not considered an “all-encompassing”
list of procedures, but “simply general procedures designed to assist
the panel.”153 However, panels are not authorized to disregard explicit
provisions of the DSU. For example, in India–Patents, the
complainant tried to advance a new claim under TRIPS Article 63 at
the first substantive meeting.154 Although the respondent objected that
the claim was not within the terms of reference, the panel held that all
legal claims would be considered if they were made prior to the first
substantive meeting. The Appellate Body reversed the panel’s decision
by finding that it was not consistent with the letter and spirit of the
DSU. It further noted that:
Although panels enjoy some discretion in establishing
their own working procedures, this discretion does not
extend to modifying the substantive provisions of the

151

DSU, supra note 22, at art. 18.2.
See Appendix 3 to the DSU, Working Procedures, supra note 22, at 1245, ¶ 2.
153
YANG GUOHUA, BRYAN MERCURIO & LI YONGJIE, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
UNDERSTANDING: A DETAILED INTERPRETATION 145 (2005).
154
Panel Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sep. 5, 1997).
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DSU…Nothing in the DSU gives a panel the authority
either to disregard or to modify other explicit
provisions of the DSU. The jurisdiction of a panel is
established by that panel’s terms of reference, which
are governed by Article 7 of the DSU…A panel cannot
assume jurisdiction that it does not have.155
After oral statements, parties are invited to respond to questions
posed by the panel or the opposing party. Questions are typically
distributed in written form, and parties may reserve the right to answer
and respond in written form until they receive authorization from their
respective governments to answer specific questions. The parties
usually submit written answers to the panel and to the other party,
even if the question was discussed at the hearing. The deliberations of
the panel and the documents submitted to it are confidential.156 For
this reason, third parties are not entitled to receive documents from the
proceedings, except the first written submissions. The 1979 Annex on
the Customary Practice of the GATT provides that written memoranda
submitted to the panel are considered confidential, but are made
available to the parties involved in the dispute.157 The DSU makes an
effort to reduce the confidentiality of the process, only allowing
Members to treat information submitted by another member as
confidential information.158 Also, in order to promote transparency in
the panel process, the Appendix specifies that if a party submits
confidential information in its written submissions to the panel, it
shall, upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential summary
that the public may view.159
Moreover, under the DSU, panel reports are automatically binding
when coupled with the prospect of appellate review, enticing panelists
to write more elaborate and comprehensive analysis than those made
within the GATT. This regulation induces disputing parties to use
every possible avenue in securing more favourable rulings, including
the usage of various procedural objections put forward by the
disputing parties.
The WTO dispute settlement system is significantly more
formalized than the previous GATT mechanism, but not to the extent
of civil procedures in the majority of national legal systems. Panels
155
Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶ 92, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997).
156
DSU, supra note 22, at 1245, app. 3, ¶ 3.
157
See 1979 Annex on the Customary Practices of the GATT, supra note 4.
158
DSU, supra note 22, at 1245, app. 3, ¶ 3.
159
Id.
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should always consider the principle of good faith when conducting
the panel process. Failure of a complainant to strictly comply with the
procedural rules in requesting a panel does not necessarily void the
process; rather, the panel will likely give additional time to the
complainant to remove the discrepancies.
A notable preliminary objection raised by the United States in the
panel proceedings relating to U.S.–Foreign Sales Corporations
illustrates this principle of good faith.160 In this case, the respondent
contended that the European Communities’ claim should be dismissed
because the request for consultations did not include a “statement of
available evidence” as required by Article 4.2 of the Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM). The United States further contended
that the request was defective because it could not form the basis for a
panel proceeding. The panel rejected the preliminary objection stating
that no specific provision of the DSU or the SCM Agreement would
require dismissal of a claim under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement as
a consequence of failure to comply with Article 4.2.161
On appeal, the United States insisted that the consequence of a
failure to include a “statement of available evidence” under Article 4.2
of the SCM Agreement had to be the dismissal of the European
Communities’ claim under Article 3 of the same agreement. The
Appellate Body found the requirement of Article 4.2 supplemented the
conditions of Article 4.4 of the DSU. Since the issue of whether a
measure is a prohibited subsidy often requires a detailed examination
of facts, they decided the request for consultations had to satisfy the
requirements of both provisions. The Appellate Body further observed
that this requirement presented “available evidence of the character of
the measure as ‘subsidy’ that must be indicated, and not merely
evidence of the existence of the measure.”162
Despite the defect in the request for consultations, the Appellate
Body recognized that the United States had still participated in
them.163 The first occasion in which the United States objected to the
request for consultations was in the panel proceedings. The Appellate

160
Panel Report, United States—Tax Treatment of “Foreign Sales
Corporations,” (FSC), WT/DS108/R, (Oct. 8, 1999), as modified by the Appellate
Body Report, United States—Tax Treatment of Foreign Sales Corporations (FCS),
WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000) (adopted on Mar. 20, 2000).
161
Panel Report, United States—Tax Treatment of “Foreign Sales
Corporations,” (FSC), WT/DS108/R, (Oct. 8, 1999), at ¶ 7.10.
162
Appellate Body Report, Appellate Body Report, United States—Tax
Treatment of Foreign Sales Corporations (FCS), WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000)
(adopted on Mar. 20, 2000), at ¶ 161.
163
And perhaps, as the panel asserted, the respondent consciously chose not to
seek clarification. Panel Report, supra note 161, at ¶ 7.10.
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Body rejected this objection because the respondent had various
opportunities to raise objections during consultations that lasted almost
a year. More significantly, the United States did not raise the objection
during the two DSB meetings where request for the establishment of a
panel was on the agenda. For this reason, the United States acted as if
it had accepted the establishment of the panel. Consequently, the
United State’s behavior exemplified the meaning of an estoppel.
In an effort to reduce frivolous objections, the Appellate Body
emphasizes that both the complainant and the respondent possess an
obligation to comply with the requirements of the DSU and other
covered agreements in good faith and added:
By good faith compliance, complaining Members
accord to the responding Members the full measure of
protection and opportunity to defend, contemplated by
the letter and spirit of the procedural rules. The same
principle of good faith requires that responding
Members seasonably and promptly bring claimed
procedural deficiencies to the attention of the
Complaining Member, and to the DSB or the Panel, so
that correction, if needed, can be made to resolve
disputes. The procedural rules of WTO dispute
settlement are designed to promote, not the
development of litigation techniques, but simply the
fair, prompt and effective resolution of trade
disputes.164
Thus the current WTO system provides a higher level of
transparency, though the overall increased complexity from the
additional procedural objections might leave some yearning for the
more simple GATT procedures.
3. Second written submissions
After the first substantive meeting, the parties have two to three
weeks to send their second written submissions. During this time,
parties have the opportunity to respond to the first written submission
of the other party and to rebut the facts and arguments advanced by it
at the first substantive meeting. Unlike the first written submissions,

164

Appellate Body Report, United States—Tax Treatment of Foreign Sales
Corporations (FCS), WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000) (adopted on Mar. 20, 2000), at
¶ 166.
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the second written submissions have to be sent in by the parties at the
same time.
4. The second substantive meeting
After the panel has determined a broad outline of the case in the
first meeting, it reconvenes for a second substantive meeting with the
parties. This meeting, which is usually held within one month of
receiving the second written submission rebuttals, provides another
opportunity for the panel to engage in fact-finding with the parties.165
Having this second opportunity to ensure the facts are correct is
important because the Appellate Body will review only points of law.
Though the purpose of the first substantive meeting is mainly about
noting the issues in which the panel is concerned and of the arguments
of the other party, the second substantive meeting provides a forum in
which the parties can concentrate the debate on specific disagreements
on the facts or on legal interpretation.166
As mentioned earlier, the current process is becoming less
concerned with confidentiality than the earlier agreements. Paragraph
10 of Appendix 3 of the Working Procedures to the DSU commands
“in the interest of full transparency” that all presentations, rebuttals,
and statements be made in the presence of the other party. 167
Moreover, each party’s written submissions, including any comments
on the descriptive part of the report and responses to questions put by
the panel, shall be made available to the other party or parties.168

165

However, the Working Procedure states that the second substantive meeting
should be held one to two weeks after the receipt of the rebuttals. DSU, supra note 22,
Appendix 3, at ¶ 12(d).
166
Hudec suggests a further legalization of the panel process in regard to the
panel hearing. In his view, similarly to hearings at national courts, panels should
question the parties on the most vulnerable points of their argumentation. Currently,
based on the GATT legacy, the panels serve to assist the disputing parties, and there is
considerable control on behalf of the parties on the panel proceeding. “The best way to
develop the facts is to obtain the parties’ agreement to them, and this usually requires
questioning by the panel to fill in the gaps – questioning that the party being
questioned would often prefer not to answer fairly and fully: Full development of the
legal side of the case often requires similar questioning, just as judges in civil
litigation find it valuable to sharpen their understanding of legal issues by probing
apparent weak points in each party’s legal arguments.” Robert E. Hudec, The New
WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, PSIO
Occasional Paper, WTO Series Number 11, IUHEI–Geneva 1998 at 50 [hereinafter An
Overview].
167
DSU, supra note 22, at 1246, app. 3, ¶ 10.
168
Id.
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One of the main proposals for reform in the panel process is to
open panel hearings to the public. Since this process is confidential
under the current regime, such a proposal implies a major change to
the system. While this change may increase the legitimacy of the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, it is likely to have a negative
impact on the party’s behavior because it would not contribute to
reaching a “positive solution” to a dispute, which is the major aim of
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Furthermore, the parties will
be reluctant to publicly submit confidential business information.
Moreover, if things work well, there is no need to change them. This
kind of practice could be supported, however, if the disputing parties
see no obstacles in making the hearings of a particular dispute public.
Moreover, Member States should be encouraged to follow this kind of
practice, as it will make the panel process more transparent.169
Whether confidential or not, the second substantive meeting
usually marks the end of submitting any further written submissions,
though there are some occasions where the parties have been allowed
to send a third set of written submissions due to unusual
circumstances.170
Such was the case in EC – Customs, where the claimant (the
United States) presented new evidence at the second substantive
meeting. The European Communities argued that the evidence
contained in section III of the United States' oral statement was “new,”
submitted too late, and should therefore be found inadmissible by the
panel. The United States asserted that the evidence constituted
“evidence necessary for the purposes of rebuttals” within the meaning
of paragraph 12 of the Working Procedures adopted for the particular
dispute.171 The panel decided to admit the evidence submitted by the
United States without concluding whether the evidence in question

169
There have already been a few precedents in this respect. Recently, the
parties and the panel in US—Continued Suspension and Canada—Continued
Suspension WT/DS 320R (Sept. 2006); WT/DS 321/R (Oct. 2006) agreed to make
public the hearings of the panels. The disputes are linked to a broader dispute between
the parties (i.e. the EC–Hormones case). In the present cases, the EC contends that the
United States and Canada should have removed their retaliatory measures since the
EC had removed the measures found to be inconsistent with WTO in the EC–
Hormones case. The EC claims against the United States include violations of GATT,
art. I, II (1994) and DSU, art. 21.5, 22.8, 23.1, and 23.2 (a), (c).
170
E.g., Interim Report, EC—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech
Products,
WT/DS291/INTERIM,
WT/DS292/INTERIM,
WT/DS293/INTERIM, (Feb. 7, 2006). Due to the complex nature of the legal and
factual issues of the case, the parties were allowed to transmit a third written
submission.
171
Panel Report, European Communities—Selected Customs Matters, ¶ 7.65,
WT/DS315/R (June 16, 2006).
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could be characterized as “new” factual evidence or as evidence
“necessary for purposes of rebuttals” within the meaning of paragraph
12 of the Working Procedures.
The panel emphasized that its decision only related to the
admissibility of evidence referred to by the United States in section III
of its oral statement at the second substantive meeting, and that it had
“no bearing on the weight, if any, that the Panel may ultimately
attribute to such evidence.”172
G. The Interim Review Stage
Under the old GATT, the panel issued a descriptive section of the
draft report after the second substantive meeting. This report included
an introduction to the case, its factual content, and the legal arguments
put forward by the parties. This phase was useful because it provided
an opportunity for the panel to see if it had correctly assessed the facts
of the case and understood the parties’ arguments.173
The DSU developed a similar innovation for the final stages of the
panel procedure—the Interim Review Stage. This stage consists of two
phases. The first phase provides parties with an opportunity to
comment on the descriptive part of the panel report, while the second
phase allows the parties to comment on the entire panel report draft.
Panels issue the descriptive part of the report after the second
substantive meeting, which summarizes the facts and arguments raised
by the parties in the course of the proceedings. The parties may submit
comments on the descriptive part pointing out whether certain facts
and arguments have been precisely recorded. This should be done
within the time limit established by the panel, normally within two
weeks after receipt of the descriptive part of the report.174 This first
phase is the last opportunity to correct any factual errors in the panel
report.
Approximately two to four weeks after the deadline for receipt of
comments on the descriptive part, the panel issues an interim report.175
The interim report contains both the descriptive part and the findings
of the panel. Parties must submit written comments on the interim
report within one week of its publication. However, if no comments
are received, then the interim report becomes final.
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Id.
See HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 69.
174
DSU, Appendix 3, ¶ 12(f).
175
See Appendix 3 to the DSU, Working Procedures, supra note 22, at ¶ 12 (g).
Panelists dealing with lengthy and complex legal issues usually need more time to
complete the interim report.
173
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In practice, parties receive the interim report first and then
translations are circulated among WTO Members. The parties possess
the right to make comments and request additional meetings on the
“precise aspects of the interim report” 176 raised in the written
comments.177 Additional evidence is inadmissible during this stage.
In India – Automotive Industry, the panel accepted new evidence
that India presented at the interim review stage. Although the new
evidence submission arrived too late, the panel nonetheless accepted
the evidence because it “sought to confirm the official status of the
measure as it had already been argued and discussed during the
proceedings.” 178 It is also acknowledged that new arguments are
permissible during the interim stage if they are made “in the context of
a request for review of precise aspects of the interim report.”179
1. Issues raised by the interim review stage
The DSU requires the panel to include a discussion of the
arguments brought forth during the interim review stage in the
findings of the final report. Panels take into account the observations
made by the parties on specific points. In practice, the final panel
report contains this additional information in a special section entitled
“Interim Review.”
Shortly after the introduction of the interim review stage, some
scholars expressed doubts about its positive role. For example, Hudec
argues that the interim review stage model is useless in WTO panels
because it is an imitation of the Canada-United States Free Trade

176

This was confirmed by the panel report in Australia–Salmon. Australia
requested a review of the entire report as “a large part of the legal reasoning of the
interim report was not based on an objective assessment of the matter before the
Panel.” The panel disagreed with the complainant and only reviewed the interim report
“in light of the comments made by the parties which relate to ‘precise aspects’ of the
interim report.” Panel Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, ¶
7.3, WT/DS18/R (June 12, 1998).
177
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 15.2, second sentence. Such an additional meeting
at the interim review stage was held in the EC–Hormones case. The panel emphasized
that only “precise aspects” of the interim report, identified in the written comments,
may be subject to review. Panel Report, European Communities—Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), part VII, ¶ 7.1, WT/DS48/R/CAN
(Aug. 18, 1997).
178
Panel Report, India—Measure Affecting the Automotive Sector,
WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R (Dec. 21, 2001) at ¶ 6.54. It should be remembered that
the question of admitting evidence is very different from the question of how much
weight the evidence is going to receive.
179
Panel Report, United States–Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/R (Mar.
31, 2000) at ¶ 5.18.

122

WINTER 2006

PANEL PROCEDURES

Agreement (CUSTA) and NAFTA, where the needs of the stage are
very different than the needs under the DSU. In both CUSTA and
NAFTA, says Hudec, panel members are all non-governmental
lawyers and academics who lack any formal connection with the
international institutions in question. Moreover, the permanent
secretariats of these institutions do not offer panels any substantive
legal advice, and panels hold only one hearing.
Among other arguments supporting this thesis are that the WTO
panels are supported by legal professionals from the WTO Secretariat,
the process involves two or three substantive meetings, and panel
decisions may be appealed before the Appellate Body. Hudec notes
that “[a] specific change in the panel procedure that has enlisted
considerable support is a proposal to delete the ‘interim report’ stage
of the panel process,” suggesting that by removing the interim review
stage, panels will have more time to prepare their reports.180
P. Pescatore also critiques the interim review stage. Initially, he
suggests that the development of the rules and procedures, such as the
interim review stage, increases the procedure required by the panel,
and promotes a “countervailing tendency of governments to regain
control of the system at all stages” by influencing the panel’s
deliberations and legal argumentation. He further asserts that this
influence not only jeopardizes the panelists’ independence, but may
also unbalance the final report because the panel must comment on all
objections made by the parties at this late stage.181
The interim review stage during the first years of the DSU brought
with it exaggerated fears for several reasons. Firstly, the new WTO
framework includes a number of new substantial legal obligations.
Additionally, the types of cases put forward not only present complex
legal issues, they also require heavy documentation—a daunting
combination. . That being said, the interim review stage does spare the
parties from future headaches owing to a surprising final panel report
by offering them an opportunity during the interim, to voice their
concerns over any indications of the panel’s unsound reasoning.
However, Hudec also suggests that the interim review stage
discourages the losing party from raising its objections because the
panel will correct its error and as a consequence, the party will lose “a

180

Hudec, An Overview, supra note 166, at 53–54. See also Andrew Shoyer, The
First Three Years of WTO Dispute Settlement: Observations and Suggestions, 1 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 277 (1998).
181
Pescatore, supra note 76, at 39–41. It should be noted that this article was
written in 1993 when the Uruguay Round was in progress and the DSU was not yet in
force.
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weapon on appeal.”182 Although this argument appears plausible, an
opposing side may advance in support of the opposite view. On one
hand, if a party does not raise its objections, the panel will have
additional time to concentrate on the preparation of the report.
However, on the other hand, if the party raises its objections, it will be
even better since the panel will be able to correct its legal reasoning at
an early stage. Therefore, the Appellate Body will only have to
confirm the panel’s corrected legal argument. In sum, because the
panel’s decision may not be appealed, the interim review stage helps
correct any unconvincing legal interpretations.
Moreover, the interim review stage is confined to both the time
limits established by Article 12.8 of the DSU, 183 and the policy that
parties are not allowed to advance any further evidence or discuss the
substance of the case. 184 These requirements both guarantee that
panels are not overloaded with new legal work at this stage and that no
undue burden will be placed on the panelists. Despite Hudec’s
assertions, the interim review stage does slow the panel process, but is
actually a tool to ease the panels’ efforts in reaching more convincing
legal interpretations and to improve the quality of their panel reports
within the given time limits.
Furthermore, the submission of written comments is a legal right.
If the parties fail to send in comments within the time limit established
by the panel, the interim report is considered final and is circulated to
the Members. Whether or not the interim review stage fulfills the
WTO Members’ expectations as embodied in the DSU requires a
detailed study of WTO cases over an extended period. The panel
reports from the first years of the WTO do indicate that the interim
review stage, rather than being an additional burden on the panel, is a
useful innovation that results in more well- reasoned reports.
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Hudec, An Overview, supra note 166, at 54.
Six months is provided for the panel to complete its report, or three months in
cases of urgency.
184
New evidence cannot be introduced during the interim review stage. In EC–
Customs, in its comments on the Interim Report, the European Communities referred
to a number of exhibits that it had not relied upon previously during the panel
proceedings. The complainant (the United States) objected by stating that “new
evidence during the interim review stage of the Panel’s proceedings is entirely
impermissible and the Panel should give no consideration to that evidence.” The panel
found that Article 15.2 of the DSU clearly indicated that “the purpose of the interim
review stage of the Panel's proceedings is to review ‘'precise aspects’ of the Interim
Report.” Therefore, pursuant to Article 15.2 of the DSU, the panel was precluded from
taking into consideration evidence not reflected in the Interim Report. Panel Report,
EC—Selected Customs Matters, ¶¶ 6.3–6.6, WT/DS315/R (June 16, 2006).
183
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2. Third parties and amicus briefs
a. Third parties. Third-party participation in panel proceedings
increased considerably within the WTO as compared to that within the
GATT. In the WTO, participation of third parties in consultations is
allowed only for WTO Member States, and additionally, depends on
the will of the main disputing parties. However, third party
participation in panel proceedings cannot be rejected if the party
demonstrates a “substantial interest in the matter.” In practice, panels
apply a broad interpretation to the meaning of substantial interest, and
each Member with a vested interest in a DSB matter to the DSB takes
part in the panel proceedings.
The DSU grants third parties limited procedural rights. Under the
DSU, third parties receive an opportunity to be heard and make written
submissions to the panel. The panel report reflects these submissions
and notifies parties of their existence.185 Third parties receive the main
parties’ first written submissions, but can only attend panel sessions by
invitation. The Appendix specifies that a third party that has given
notice of its interest in a dispute shall be invited in writing to present
its view during a session of the first meeting set aside specially for that
purpose.186 In this meeting, the party may answer questions advanced
by the panel or other parties. After the end of the session, third parties
do not attend other sessions or meetings in the framework of the
proceedings.
b. Amicus curiae briefs. The recent trend of amicus curiae briefs
(non-governmental organizations and individuals submitting
unsolicited briefs) is subject to a broad debate since such submissions
did not exist within the old GATT dispute settlement mechanism.
For example, amicus briefs have been filed in US – Reformulated
Gasoline,187 in EC – Hormones,188 and in subsequent cases. In US –
Shrimps, the panel interpreted Article 13 of the DSU to mean (even
though it had authority to seek information from non-governmental
source) that it would be “incompatible” with the DSU to accept and
take into account such unsolicited information. For this reason, if any
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DSU, supra note 22, at art. 10.2.
DSU, supra note 22, at 1245, app. 3, ¶ 6.
187
Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996).
188
ee Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/R/USA, WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997) as modified by
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS26/48/AB/R, (adopted Feb. 13, 1998).
186
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party relies on such submissions, it could include them in its own
submissions.189
The Appellate Body reversed this finding by stating that
acceptance of unsolicited information by a panel is not incompatible
with the DSU. A panel has discretion to accept or ignore information
and advice submitted to it, regardless of whether it had been requested
by the panel or not. 190 The Appellate Body has also observed that
access to the dispute settlement system under the covered agreements
is not available to individuals and organizations, but only to WTO
Members.
In emphasizing the difference between third parties in the panel
process and amicus briefs, the Appellate Body notes that third parties
have a legal right to make submissions to the panel and a legal right to
have them considered by the panel. As a consequence, “a panel is
obliged in law to accept and give due consideration only to
submissions made by the parties and the third parties in a panel
proceeding.”191 Hence, panels have no obligation to consider amicus
briefs, but may do so at their discretion.
After US – Shrimps, amicus briefs have been filed in a number of
cases. In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body elaborated on an
additional procedure for filing amicus submissions. Although this
procedure was used specifically for that appeal only, it has provided
numerous requirements, inter alia, that the brief shall indicate “in what
way the applicant will make a contribution to the resolution of this
dispute that is not likely to be repetitive of what has been already
submitted by a party or third party to the dispute.”192 The Appellate
Body has received seventeen applications pursuant to the additional
procedure. For one reason or another, the Appellate Body has denied
the right to file a written brief in all of them.
The stringent requirements set by the Appellate Body for
submitting amicus briefs create a number of legal problems, thereby
cancelling the significance of these submissions. One problem is that
such submissions are not provided for explicitly in the DSU and other
WTO Agreements. Additionally, the disapproval of some WTO
Members and, more particularly, of a number of developing Members,
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Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 7.7–7.8, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998).
190
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, ¶ 108, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
191
Id. at ¶ 101.
192
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products (EC-Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R
(adopted Apr. 5, 2001, at ¶¶ 52.
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is evident. Their view is that allowing the filing of unsolicited
information deprives a panel from the right to decide the kind of
information that is needed. Therefore, they believe if no one requests
such information, then these briefs should not be accepted. Another
problem is that in order to file these submissions, applicants must
know the disputing parties’ views in order for the amicus briefs to not
repeat what has already been submitted by the parties or third parties.
The WTO dispute settlement system, however, remains
“intergovernmental,” and the panel and appeal proceedings are
confidential, and most States would be reluctant to reveal confidential
information anyway. Moreover, these submissions are often biased
and contradict the Member government’s positions. Finally, allowing
extensive submissions also creates a heavy burden on panels and the
Appellate Body. Considering the numerous requirements elaborated
by the Appellate Body in US – Shrimps, and the fact that no single
panel or the Appellate Body ever based its findings on amicus briefs, it
appears the debate on such submissions is “much ado about
nothing.”193
IV. SPECIAL PROCEDURAL RULES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Developing countries have increased their participation in the
panel proceedings in recent years. For example, in 2001 seventy-five
percent of all complaints were filed by developing countries.194 Also,
developing WTO Members often take part in panel proceedings as
third parties. Rules on special and differential treatment for developing
countries are elaborated either as substantive WTO provisions (e.g.,
longer time for implementation of certain obligations) or procedural
dispute settlement rules (e.g., faster procedure, longer time limits).
The DSU recognizes the special needs of developing countries by
including rules unique to developing countries participating in panel
proceedings. At the stage of the panel composition, if a dispute is
between a developed and a developing country, the latter may request
the appointment of at least one panelist from a developing country
Member.195
In examining a complaint against a developing country Member,
the panel shall afford the respondent more time to prepare its defens,
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Petros C. Mavroidis, Amicus Curiae Briefs before the WTO: Much Ado about
Nothing, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION: STUDIES IN
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN HONOUR OF CLAUS-DIETER EHLERMANN, 317–30
(Armin von Bogdandy, Petros C. Mavroidis & Yves Meny eds. 2002).
194
Data provided in GUOHUA, MERCURIO & YONGJIE, supra note 153, at 110.
195
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 8.10.
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eif necessary.196 Thus upon request of a developing country, the panel
should set up longer time periods than those provided in the DSU and
the Working Procedure Annex. If a developing Member raises a
question on special and differential treatment within the panel
proceedings regarding both substantive and procedural rules, the panel
is obligated to indicate in the panel report the form in which these
rules have been taken into account pursuant to Article 12.11 of the
DSU.197
In addition, when a developing Member brings proceedings
against a developed Member, the former may choose to apply the
accelerated procedure under the Contracting Parties' Decision of 5
April 1966. 198 These rules originated from the old GATT dispute
settlement mechanism, and remain applicable within the WTO due to
an explicit reference in Article 3.12 of the DSU.199 However, except
for a few cases, developing Members have not invoked the provisions
of the decision. These proceedings have only been requested in six
instances under the old GATT.200
If a developing country resorts to the 1966 Decision, Articles 4, 5,
6 and 12 of the DSU do not apply, and the rules of the decision apply
instead. The 1966 Decision provides that if consultations between the
parties fail, the developing country may solicit the offices of the WTO
Director-General to conduct consultations between the disputants.201 If
the consultations do not settle the dispute within two months, the
Director-General must prepare a special report on the actions he has
taken at the request of either party. In regards to the panel stage, the
decision requires the panel to complete its report in only sixty days (in
contrast with the normal six-month time limit for completion of the
panel report). 202 In addition, the panel shall pay due regard to all
circumstances relating to the challenged measure and its impact on the
economic development of the developing Member.203

196

Such additional time to prepare its first written submissions was granted to
India. Panel Report, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textiles and Industrial Products, ¶ 5.8–5.10, WT/DS90/R (Apr. 6, 1999).
197
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 12.11.
198
Conciliation, Procedures Under Article XXIII (Apr. 5, 1966), GATT B.I.S.D.
(14th Supp.), at 18 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Decision].
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DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.12.
200
2 GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE: ANALYTICAL INDEX 765 (WTO
1995).
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1966 Decision, supra note 199.
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See 1966 Decision, supra note 199, at 19, ¶ 7.
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See 1966 Decision, supra note 199, at 19, ¶ 6.
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All procedural rules applicable to developing Members also apply
to least-developed WTO Members. In addition, there are a few rules in
the DSU specifically for least-developed Members. When
consultations have not settled a dispute involving a least-developed
country, the director-general or the chairman of the DSB shall, at the
request of the least developed country, “offer good offices,
conciliation and mediation with a view to assisting the parties to settle
the dispute, before a request for a panel is made.”204 Article 24 of the
DSU 205 requires Members to exercise due restraint when initiating
dispute settlement proceedings against a less developed country. Such
restraint is exercised when rulings are not implemented within a
reasonable period of time, and a Member requests compensation for or
authorization to suspend obligations against a least-developed
country.206 Least-developed countries receive special consideration at
all stages of the dispute settlement procedures. Finally, the WTO
Secretariat provides legal advice and assistance on dispute settlement
to both developing and least-developed Members.207
V. IMPORTANT ISSUES OF THE PANEL PROCESS
A. The Burden of Proof
The issue of the burden of proof was less significant within the old
GATT dispute settlement system, most likely because disputing parties
often presented panels with agreed-upon facts. Under the old GATT,
the burden of proof was considered as “more [of] an intellectual
concept than a practical one” because panels questioned both parties,
giving neither one nor the other the benefit of the doubt.208
However, the WTO incorporated at least two rules regarding the
burden of proof from the old GATT system. First, the complainant
party must prove the violation it alleges. Second, a respondent who
invokes general exceptions under GATT Article XX must prove that
the conditions related are fulfilled.209 In the WTO panel process, the
question of who bears the burden of proof is critical because unlike the
early years of the GATT, the disputing parties within the WTO contest
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DSU, supra note 22, at art. 24.2.
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 24.
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DSU, supra note 22, at art. 24.1, last sentence.
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DSU, supra note 22, at art. 27.2.
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In this sense, see Plank, supra note 15, at 78.
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On the burden of proof in the GATT and the WTO, see Joost Pauwelyn,
Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Bears the Burden?
1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 227 (1998).
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numerous facts and evidence in the panel proceedings, and the
allocation of the burden of proof may decide the outcome of the case.
The DSU does not contain specific rules regarding the burden of proof
in panel proceedings; however, this is important because in cases
where certain facts are questionable during the proceedings, a panel
will rule in favor of the party who does not bear the burden of proof.
The Appellate Body emphasizes that the party who asserts a fact
must prove it. In other words, the burden of proof for a fact rests upon
the party who asserts that fact. 210 Thus a complainant alleging
inconsistency with a WTO agreement must prove its claim; however,
no exact standard for the level of proof exists. The Appellate Body has
clarified that the complainant must present evidence sufficient to make
a prima facie case that the claim is true.211 In turn, the respondent has
to rebut the claim. When invoking an exception to a particular
provision, the respondent carries the burden of proving that the
requirements for such an exception are met.212
Articles XX and XXI of the GATT 1994 provide examples of
applicable exceptions. 213 WTO jurisprudence further clarifies some
specific items regarding the burden of proof. For instance, the
Enabling Clause provided by the Decision on More Favourable
Treatment is not a typical exception to Article II of GATT 1994. Thus
the claimant has to invoke the Enabling Clause and demonstrate the
measure’s inconsistency with it. Likewise, the link between Articles
5(1) and 5(7) of the SPS Agreement 214 is not a rule-exception
relationship. As the panel in EC – Biotech Products (“GMOs”) stated,
Art. 5(7) sets forth a right, not an exception, to Article 5(1).215 Thus
the burden of proof rests with the complainant to demonstrate the
inconsistency of the measure with Article 5(7). In other words, the
complainant must demonstrate that the respondent did not fulfil one of
the four requirements stated in the provision.216
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Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) (adopted May
23, 1997), part IV, at 12 et seq.
211
Id.
212
Such exceptions are, for instance, those provided for in Articles XX and XXI
of the GATT 1994.
213
GATT 1994, Annex 1 A to the WTO, 33 I.L.M 1156 (1994).
214
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS),
Annex 1 to the WTO Agreement, reproduced in THE LEGAL TEXTS. THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 401 (Cambridge
University Press & WTO 1999) at 59.
215
Interim Report, EC—Biotech Products (GMOs), ¶ 7.2988.
216
The four requirements are: 1) the measure is imposed in respect of situation
where “relevant scientific evidence is insufficient;” 2) the measure is imposed on the
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1. Evidence
Neither the old GATT System, nor the DSU, contains any specific
provisions concerning evidence in the panel procedure. Rather, the
WTO dispute settlement relies on rules established by international
law and other international tribunals. Panels have discretion on the
type of evidence deemed acceptable and the weight given to each
piece of evidence. Panels may use their own discretion and investigate
the facts without request from any party. A panel must base its
findings only on the evidence submitted by the parties, but may seek
information from any relevant source. However, this does not mean
that a panel is allowed to carry out the case. In order for the panel to
search for additional information, the claimant must first establish a
prima facie case by presenting evidence sufficient to raise a
presumption of fact or to establish the fact in question.
A panel may seek technical information, when it considers this
appropriate, by establishing an expert review group or consulting
individual scientific experts as set forth in Appendix 4 to the DSU.217
A panel may also consult experts on an individual basis.
Individual scientific experts were consulted for the first time in EC –
Asbestos.218 In this case, the panel found that it had the right to consult
individual experts, despite the respondent’s objection and argument
that a panel may consult experts only through an expert review group
under Appendix 4 to the DSU.219
Although the DSU does not prescribe specific time limits for
submitting evidence, panels are obligated to respect the principle of
due process throughout the panel procedure, and to ensure that they
give parties an adequate opportunity to respond to the evidence.
Normally, the deadline for submitting evidence is during the end of the
first substantive meeting, but depending on the circumstances,
evidence can be accepted by the panel at a later time. The panel may
basis of available pertinent information; 3) the Member “seek[s] to obtain additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk;” and 4) the Member
“review[s] the measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.” Art. 5.7 of the
SPS Agreement, Annex 1 to the WTO Agreement, reproduced in THE LEGAL TEXTS.
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 401
(Cambridge University Press & WTO 1999) at 59.
217
DSU, supra note 22, Appendix 4.
218
Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos Containing Products (EC-Asbestos), WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000) as
modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS135/AB/R (July 25, 2000) (adopted Apr.
5, 2001).
219
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products (EC-Asbesotos), WT/DS135/AB/R
(March 12, 2001) (adopted Apr. 5, 2001) at ¶ 147.
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grant a time extension if the party shows there is a good cause for
submitting the evidence and if the evidence is needed to respond to
rebuttal arguments.
2. Rules of interpretation and the applicable law
The DSU requires panels to state in the report the findings of facts,
the applicability of relevant provisions, and the basic rationale and
recommendations of the findings. According to Article 11.1 of the
DSU, “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter
before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and
the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered
agreements.”220
Despite this objective requirement, appeals grounded in the
argument that “the panel has failed to make an objective assessment of
the facts” have been quickly dismissed by the Appellate Body in
several cases. In United States – Zeroing, the European Communities
contended that the panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the
DSU by demonstrating “insufficient reasoning” and not making an
objective assessment of the facts.221 The Appellate Body rejected the
claim, emphasizing that a claim under Article 11 of the DSU is a “very
serious allegation” and that a challenge under Article 11 of the DSU
must not be vague or ambiguous. On the contrary, such a challenge
must be clearly articulated and substantiated with specific
arguments. 222 Moreover, “not every failure by the Panel in the
appreciation of the evidence before it can be characterized as failure to
make an objective assessment of the facts.” 223 Thus the Appellate
Body rejected the claim because it was “vague and mentioned only in
passing in its appellant's submission.”224
Apart from making an objective assessment of the facts, panels
shall apply the relevant legal provisions. The applicable law in the
panel proceedings within the old GATT was quite straightforward
because GATT panels normally applied the provisions of the GATT
only. This question, however, is much more complicated under the
WTO in light of the much broader trade issues covered by the WTO
agreements. The connection between the WTO law and international
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DSU, supra note 22, at art. 11.1.
Appellate Body Report, United States—Laws, Regulations and Methodology
for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), ¶ 251,WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18,
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law is obvious. While some WTO agreements refer to other disciplines
of international law (e.g., Article XX of GATT 1994), other WTO
provisions make a direct link with particular treaties that are outside
the WTO law (e.g., Article 1 (3) of TRIPS). In his analysis on Article
7 of the DSU, Pauwelyn concludes that rules of international law can
be applied in the panel proceedings unless the WTO agreements
explicitly deviate or contract out of this other law.225
The DSU in Article 3.2 establishes a direct link with international
law by explicitly providing that the WTO dispute settlement system
aims at preserving the rights and obligations of Members under the
covered agreements, and at clarifying “the existing provisions of those
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law.” 226 The old GATT did not contain such a
provision.
Scholars have expressed different opinions on whether or not
substantive non-WTO rules may apply in panel proceedings. Some
authors assert that international law rules may not be applied as an
autonomous source of law, arguing that only customary rules of
interpretation may be considered by panels and the Appellate Body.227
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Among the many arguments supporting his thesis, Pauwelyn notes that,
unlike Article 293 of the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), Article 1131 of
NAFTA, and Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, the DSU does not make an explicit
reference to other rules of international law. Then he explains why this is the case:
[G]iven the nature of the WTO Agreement as a treaty under public
international law, there was no need for the DSU to do so. On the
contrary, the principle is that all other international law continues to
exist next to the WTO treaty unless the WTO treaty explicitly deviates
or contracts out of this other law. In other words, there was no need for
Article 7 of the DSU to explicitly include also other rules of
international law as part of the applicable law before WTO panels; to
the extent that those other rules were not deviated from in the WTO
treaty, this is automatically the case.
Joost Pauwelyn, How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on NonWorld Trade Organization Law? Questions of Jurisdiction and Merit, 6 J. WORLD
TRADE 997, 1002 (2003). See also Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coherence in
International Law: Praises for the Prohibition Against ‘Clinical Isolation’ in WTO
Dispute Settlement, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 87 (1999); Gabrielle Marceau, Conflicts of
Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 1081 (2001); Joost
Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?,
95 Am. J. Int’l L. 535 (2001) (further discussing applicable law in the panel
proceedings).
226
DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.2.
227
See Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of the WTO Dispute Resolution, 40
HARV. INT’L L.J. 333 (1999) (suggesting a narrow interpretation of the DSU
provisions with regard to the applicable law in panel proceedings).
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Other commentators suggest a broader interpretation of Article 7 of
the DSU. A distinction is made between Article 1.1 of the DSU and
Article 7 of the DSU, with the former outlining the jurisdiction of
panels and the latter relating to the law that panels may apply to a
particular dispute.228 It is clear that panels must decline jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 1.1 of the DSU if a dispute does not involve
matters within the covered agreements (i.e., is not a WTO dispute).229
However, even in this case, examination of other rules of international
law (non-WTO rules) is needed in order to determine the lack of
jurisdiction. In short, the choice of law process in the WTO is
significantly more complex as the panel looks to not only apply WTO
provisions, as was done in the GATT, but also must examine other
related non-WTO rules of international law.
Though the process is much more cumbersome, it should be
supported as a significant improvement from the GATT. According to
Article 7.1 of the DSU, panels and the Appellate Body shall examine
the matter “in the light of the relevant provisions in . . . the covered
agreement[s] cited by the parties to the dispute.”230 Pauwelyn finds
that this provision imposes an obligation on panels to address and
apply certain WTO rules; however, it does not preclude panels from
applying other non-WTO rules of international law in particular
circumstances.231
3. Panels giving deference to developing countries
In a recent case, the small country, Antigua and Barbuda, initiated
panel proceedings against the largest trading nation, the United
States.232 Even though the Appellate Body has reversed a large part of
the panel findings, Antigua and Barbuda won on essential points of the
legal battle. Inter alia, the Appellate Body confirmed the panel’s
finding that the application of the U.S. Horse-racing Act was contrary
to the U.S. obligations under the GATS. In sum, and in contrast to the
GATT, the WTO panel process has greatly advanced the deference
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See generally Lorand Bartels, Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement
Proceedings, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 499 (2001).
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DSU, supra note 22, at art. 1.1.
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DSU, supra note 22, at art. 7.1.
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Pauwelyn, How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on NonWorld Trade Organization Law? Questions of Jurisdiction and Merit, 6 J. WORLD
TRADE 997 (2003) at 1000-1001.
232
See Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) as modified
by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005).
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given to developing countries in an effort to be sensitive to their
special circumstances.
4. Time limits and other requirements in preparing the panel report
The panel starts preparing the report after the hearings are over,
and all written submissions and rebuttals have been received. The
panel makes an objective assessment of the matter before including the
facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the
relevant covered agreements. The panel must also make findings that
will assist the DSB in giving the rulings provided for in the covered
agreements.233 Lastly, and as mentioned earlier, all conclusions drawn
by the panel in its report must be reasoned.
In addition to these requirements, Article 12.8 of the DSU
provides that the period in which the panel must conduct its
examination may not exceed six months from the date on which the
composition and terms of reference are agreed upon to the issuance of
the final report to the parties of the dispute.234 In cases of urgency,
including those relating to perishable goods, panels are to aim at
issuing its report within three months. If a panel is unable to complete
its report within six months (or three months, if applicable), it must
inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay, and indicate an
estimated date of issue.
The DSU further stipulates that the period should not exceed nine
months in any case from the time the panel is established to the
circulation of the report to WTO Members. In many cases, however,
the time limits established by the DSU for completion of a panel report
are unrealistic. Panels need more time to prepare their reports based on
the reasoning requirements described above. For instance, in the EC –
Asbestos case, the time between the establishment of the panel and the
issuance of the panel report to the parties was more than 19 months.235
It would be overly ambitious to expect the panel to finish its report on
EC – Biotech Products (GMOs) in six months, since the interim report
alone amounted to more than 1,000 pages.236
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5. Adoption of panel reports
The current WTO process for adopting panel reports is, in large
part, a result of the fortuitous abolition of the veto power in the
adoption of panel reports under the old GATT. The main reason for
this change was the adoption of Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Law in
1988, which allowed unilateral trade sanctions when the United States
considered (unilaterally) other GATT Members in violation of their
GATT obligations.
The other GATT Members viewed this legislation as a threat, and
the United States, in response, complained of the weak and slow
dispute procedure, which did not efficiently protect U.S. trade
interests. As a consequence, they reached a compromise—no veto
power to block the most important decisions in the framework of the
dispute resolution mechanism (establishment of panels, adoption of
panel reports, and authorisation for retaliation), and no unilateral
action by WTO Members to decide trade disputes between them.237
In the WTO, after a panel has completed its report and has
distributed it to the WTO Members, the DSB must adopt it in order for
the report to be become binding on the disputing parties. The panel
report is put on the agenda of the DSB at the request of either
disputing party, at which point, every WTO Member has the right to
make comments and express opinions concerning the report at the
DSB meeting. According to the DSU, the DSB must adopt a panel
report not earlier than twenty-days, but not later than sixty days after
the date of its circulation to WTO Members, unless one of the
disputing parties (the complainant or the respondent, but not third
parties) appeals to the Appellate Body.238
If there is no appeal, the DSB adopts the panel report, unless a
reverse consensus arises against its adoption. Under the old GATT,
because of the rule of positive consensus, even one single formal
objection by a WTO Member was enough to block adoption. In
contrast, under the WTO, even a majority against the panel report is
not enough to prevent its adoption. After the adoption of the report, the
dispute settlement procedure goes into the stage of implementation of
the DSB’s ruling.

237
This compromise also led to the inclusion, upon the insistence of developed
countries, and more particularly the United States, of new disciplines within the scope
of the WTO, such as intellectual property and trade in services.
238
In the case of an appeal, the Appellate Body report, together with the panel
report as modified by the Appellate Body, will be adopted within thirty days after its
circulation to the WTO Members. Technically, the procedure for adoption is the same
as that for a panel report.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS

The differences between the panel procedures of the GATT and
the WTO should not be overestimated. The WTO panel procedure
relies heavily on the practice created during the forty-seven-year
existence of the old GATT. It would be insufficient to describe the old
GATT dispute settlement procedure solely as “diplomatic,” although it
is true that in the first thirty years of the GATT, the panel procedure
mainly was of a diplomatic character.
In the 1970s, this diplomatic approach to dispute resolution
became inadequate due to the increase of complicated and politically
sensitive disputes. This change toward legalization was even more
significant in the last fifteen years of the GATT’s existence. Hudec
aptly describes this evolution by stating that after 1980, the system
“transformed itself into an institution based primarily on the authority
of legal obligation.” 239 Therefore, it is not surprising that a more
legalistic system emerged after the Uruguay round. However, the
legalization of the dispute settlement system cannot be explained
solely as a passage from “more politics” in the first years of the GATT
to “more law” with the creation of the WTO. Rather, the legal
advancements in the panel procedure have been the product of a
bidirectional interaction between law and politics. The added
complications of trade issues and more extensive legal obligations
have created the need for a stronger dispute settlement system that is
able preserve the rights and obligations of WTO Members under the
agreements.240
Though the GATT panel procedure in the 1980s became more
legalized and some procedural improvements were made, it was
entirely optional. However, the political pressure to comply with the
panel rulings was considerable and helped facilitate efficiency of the
procedure. The GATT mechanism was successful, and there is good
reason to believe that its successor, the WTO dispute settlement
system, will be successful too.
The new WTO panel procedure, theoretically, is much more
detailed and improved. The panel reports under the WTO are also
more detailed and specific compared to panel reports under the GATT
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1947, and especially those from the first years of the GATT's
existence, which “did not always express clear legal results.”241
The increase of the number of disputes, which have been brought
before the WTO in its first years reveals the strong trust WTO
Members have in the settlement system. Under the old GATT, many
States refrained from starting panel proceedings and abstained from
wasting financial resources because they believed the respondent party
might block the adoption of the report once the panel process was
completed. In the WTO, a large number of cases have been settled
before the stage of panel composition possibly because complaints
have been used as a negotiating instrument. 242 Thus in light of the
compulsory dispute settlement process, a mere threat to resort to the
system can induce compliance in some cases.
The GATT legacy still has a considerable impact on WTO panel
proceedings. Panelists are still approved by the parties in most cases,
secretariat officials are considered servants of the governments rather
than of the panels, and the parties exercise a significant control over
the panel process. This facet of party control has made some legal
scholars suggest a more active role for panelists and the secretariat.
The main proponent of a further legalization of the panel process is
Hudec, who advocates transition from “party control” to an
“independent control” model.243 This seems a logical continuation of
the evolution of the panel process. A rule-based system with clear
rules is a step in the right direction because this kind of system will
create predictable conditions for business decisions and long-term
investments. If the political support remains as strong as it has been
since the creation of the GATT in 1947, then the WTO dispute
settlement system may correctly be considered the most efficient
interstate dispute settlement system in international law.
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243
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VII. TABLE: THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GATT
AND THE WTO PANEL PROCEDURES
GATT

WTO

- In the first years of the GATT, the character
of the dispute settlement system was
diplomatic, although it slowly evolved
toward a legalized system.
- After the Tokyo Round, the dispute
settlement was fragmented.
Consultations
- Consultations are derived under GATT
Article XXII or XXIII.

- The WTO has detailed procedures for the
various stages of the dispute settlement
including specific time frames.
- The WTO Dispute Settlement System is
an integrated framework that applies to all
covered agreements.
Consultations
- Consultations are derived under the DSU
and one or more of the covered agreements.
These consultations are more formalized,
and have specific time limits.
Establishment of a panel
- Panel establishment cannot be blocked
(reverse consensus in the DSB).
Panel Composition
- There are specific rules (solutions) in the
DSU when there is no agreement between
the disputing parties, regarding the
composition of the panel.
Terms of Reference
- There are standard terms of reference,
which are to be used if the parties cannot
agree on the terms of reference within 20
days from the panel’s establishment.
First Written Submissions
- Under the WTO, the claimant sends in its
written submissions two to three weeks in
advance of the respondent.
First Substantive Meeting
- Under the WTO, the parties use every
occasion to object to facts and arguments
presented by the other party; as a
consequence, there are many procedural
objections.
Third Party Participation
- There is significantly more participation
by third parties (including amicus briefs,
and use of experts’ group or individual
expert’s advice). This is because there are
more complex legal issues and because
almost all complaints are brought under two
or more covered agreements.
Interim Review Stage
- Submission of the descriptive part of the
panel report is given to the parties.
Comments are transmitted within two
weeks.
- There is an Interim Report that is

Establishment of a panel
- Consensus in the GATT Council is needed
for the establishment of a panel.
Panel Composition
- In the first years of the GATT, there was no
rule to avoid a stalemate when the parties
disagreed on the composition of the panels.
Terms of Reference
- Terms of reference had to be approved by
the GATT Council after the disputing parties
had agreed on them.
First Written Submissions
- The first written submissions were usually
transmitted simultaneously by both parties
under the old GATT.
First Substantive Meeting
- Under the GATT, the parties often
presented the panel a set of facts they agreed
upon (so-called “cluster of undisputed facts”)
Third Party Participation
- No third party participation in panels.

Submission of the Descriptive Part of the
Panel Report
- As of the 1970s, panels started transmitting
the descriptive part of the report to the
parties. There is no Interim Review Stage
under the GATT.

139

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW
GATT

Final Panel Report
- There are no particular time limits. Reports
were completed within a period of three to
nine months from the panel’s establishment
in most cases.

Panel Report Adoption
- There is no automatic adoption of panel
reports. Consensus is needed in the GATT
Council.

Implementation
- The Contracting Parties ”should” keep the
matter on which they have been given a
ruling under close watch.
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submitted to the parties (includes the
descriptive part and the panel’s findings).
Comments on this report may be submitted
to the panel.
- The parties may ask for an additional
panel meeting within one week to discuss
specific aspects of the report. This meeting
is to be held within one or two weeks.
- The discussion at the interim review stage
shall be included in the final report.
Final Panel Report
- The panel report shall be issued to the
parties within two weeks after the additional
meeting requested at the interim stage.
- The report is to be circulated to the parties
within six months from panel’s
composition, three months in cases of
urgency.
Panel Report Adoption
- Adoption of the panel report cannot be
blocked.
- Automatic adoption in the WTO, DSB by
reverse consensus within 60 days.
- Panel reports are more detailed and legally
reasoned. There is a possibility for appeal
before the Appellate Body.
Implementation
- There is a stronger mechanism for
monitoring the implementation of DSB’s
rulings.
- The Member concerned informs the DSB
of its intention regarding the
implementation of the ruling at a DSB
meeting within 30 days of the adoption.
- The issue of implementation is placed on
the BSD agenda after six months and
remains on it until the issue is resolved.
- The Member provides a status report of its
progress on the implementation of the
ruling at each such DSB meeting.

